

Masteroppgave

Role Perception of Representatives on Management Boards in EU-level Agencies

Av

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Masteroppgaven er gjennomført som et ledd i utdanningen ved Universitetet i Agder og er godkjent som sådan. Denne godkjenningen innebærer ikke at universitetet inntestår for de metoder som er anvendt og de konklusjoner som er trukket.

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Themes

1. Introduction

1.1 Theme	6
1.2 Conceptualization of Variables	7
1.2.1 Dependent Variable	7
1.2.2 Independent Variable	8
1.3 Clarification of Research Question	9
1.4 Method	10
1.5 Earlier Studies	10
1.6 EU-level Agencies and Their Management Boards	12
1.7 The Thesis Framework	13

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction	14
2.2 The Concept of Representation	15
2.3 Role Perception	15
2.3.1 The Supranational Role	17
2.3.2 The Intergovernmental Role	18
2.3.3 The Expert Role	18
2.4 Organizational Theory	19
2.4.1 Domestic Organizational Theory	19
2.4.2 Organizational Affiliation	21
2.5 Institutional Theory	21
2.5.1 Institutionalization of the Management Board	22
2.5.2 Interaction on the Management Board	23
2.6 Hypotheses	24
2.7 Mutual Exclusive Theories?	25

3. Methodology and Data

3.1 Introduction	27
3.2 Case-Study of Five EU-level Agencies	27
3.2.1 Selection of Case	28
3.3 Use of Data	28
3.4 Validity, Reliability and Generalization	30
3.5 Source Criticism & Limitations	30

3.6 Ethical Considerations	31
4. EU-level Agencies and Their Management Boards	
4.1 Introduction	33
4.2 EU-level Agencies	33
4.3 The Management Boards	36
4.3.1 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency	36
4.3.2 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	37
4.3.3 EMEA – European Medicines Agency	38
4.3.4 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency	39
4.3.5 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	40
5. The Influence of Organizational Characteristics	
5.1 Introduction	41
5.2 Domestic Organizations and Their Organizational Structure	42
5.3 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency	42
5.4 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	45
5.5 EMEA – European Medicines Agency	48
5.6 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency	50
5.7 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	52
5.8 Overview	54
5.8.1 Domestic Organizational Structure	55
5.8.2 Organizational Affiliation	56
6. The Influence of Institutional Features	
6.1 Introduction	59
6.2 Institutionalization and Interaction on the Management Board	60
6.3 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency	60
6.4 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control	63
6.5 EMEA – European Medicines Agency	65
6.6 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency	68
6.7 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	70

6.8 Overview	72
6.8.1 Institutionalization of the management board	73
6.8.2 Interaction on the Management Board	74
7. Conclusion	
7.1 Findings in This Study	77
7.2 Representation in EU	78
7.3 Further Studies	78
<i>Literature List</i>	80

Abstract

This study tries to explain what role perception different representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies adopt when they are attending board meetings and what influences the representatives to adopt the role they do. Do the representatives adopt a supranational role, an intergovernmental role or an expert role on the management board? I have chosen organizational theory and institutional theory to try to explain the different roles representatives adopt on the management board.

Empirically, I observed that the representatives adopt an ambiguous role perception where they have to balance the three roles. The study also shows that there are larger differences between representatives on different EU agencies than between representatives on the same management board.

I will give a great thanks to Jarle Trondal, Professor at University of Agder, which gave me good advice throughout this thesis. He has given me good and constructive critique and guidance to make the thesis as good as possible. I will also give a thanks to Hilmar Rommetvedt, Head of research, IRIS - International Research Institute of Stavanger, which at the end of the thesis gave me some final pointers on the thesis and some constructive advice. At the end I will give great thanks to the interview objects participating in this study. They gave good information which was crucial to the thesis.

1. Introduction

1.1 Theme

At the national level the research has been concentrated on the controversy between political loyalty and professional autonomy. At the EU-level this controversy will be added by a new dimension, the supranational aspect. Actors at the European level have to take into consideration that they are not only representing their own nation state but also the whole of the European Union.

The early research on European integration has been concentrated on the controversy between intergovernmentalism versus supranational representation in the EU system. The newer research has gone beyond this controversy, and has concentrated on arenas where there can be a mix of the two types of representation and the professional autonomy aspect. This makes it important to study the role perception of representatives in the EU-system, and how they deal with these controversies.

In this thesis I will study variation of role perception of representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies. The representatives on the management boards are national officials working in different national organizations and institutions. The different domestic organizations representatives can come from are national ministries, national agencies, expert organizations and non-governmental organizations.

I will use organizational theory and institutional theory to explain the variation of role perception national representatives can adopt on management boards in EU-level agencies. These two theories cannot explain all variation of role perception on the management board, but they can explain some of the variation. All organizations have some common characteristics; organizational structures, organizational demography and organizational locus. Institutional theory emphasizes that an institutions are more than an organization in the way that an institutions have a value on its own and unwritten norms and rules that representatives of the institutions follow. Representatives of an institution act more or less on a *logic of appropriateness* or exemplary behaviour (March & Olsen: 2004).

Research question: *How can organizational characteristics and institutional features explain variation of role perception of representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies?*

The assumption is that different representatives on management boards will adopt different roles and identities. “By “role” we usually mean a set of expectations, norms or rules, that more or less specify the desired behaviour of the role incumbent” (Egeberg 1998: 458). Since representatives on management boards can have different and several roles and identities, it is important to find out what influences the different role perceptions. The main objective of this study is to determine what role perception representatives on management board in EU-level agencies adopt when they are attending board meetings and what influences them to adopt this role.

1.2 Conceptualization of Variables

By conceptualizing the variables I will find the dimensions of the variables that will be central for the analysis. The dependent variable is role perception, and the three roles I have chosen to study; *the supranational role, the intergovernmental role and the expert role*. The independent variables I have chosen are organizational characteristic; domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation, and institutional features; institutionalization of the board and interaction on the board.

1.2.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this study is the role perception different representatives on the different management boards in EU-level agencies adopts. I have decided to divide role perception into three different roles I think are relevant for the possible role perception representatives on the management boards may adopt.

The three different roles are the supranational role, the intergovernmental role and the expert role. I will here shortly explain the different role perceptions, but I will go into the depth of the roles in chapter two.

The supranational role emphasises that representatives in the EU have the interests of the European people in mind. European interests are more important than national interests, and sees Europe as a whole.

The intergovernmental role emphasises that representatives in the EU have their own nation state interests in mind. They are representatives in the EU to promote their nation state interests.

The expert role emphasises that representatives have professional autonomy. The role is not a political interest role, but an independent role focused on scientific argument. As Trondal and Veggeland describe it; the expert role is the idea of the “complete independence” of the representative (Trondal & Veggeland 2003: 62).

1.2.2 Independent Variables

The independent variables I have chosen are organizational characteristics and institutional features. Within organizational characteristics I have chosen to focus on domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation. The representatives will have their primary affiliation to their domestic organization and are therefore closely connected. Within institutional features I have chosen to focus on institutionalization of the board and interaction on the board. These two variables are also closely connected. How institutionalized the representatives are may influence the degree of interaction and participation on the board meetings.

The first organizational variable I have chosen is domestic organizational structure. Representatives on the management boards come from national organizations and agencies. They can come from national ministries, national agencies, expert organizations or non-governmental organizations. These different organizations and institutions have different goals and interests to pursue and will influence the representatives in different ways when adopting their role on the management board.

The second organizational variable I have chosen is organizational affiliation. I will have focus on primary versus secondary affiliation. Representatives on the management boards have their primary affiliation to domestic organizations and agencies or EUs main institutions, and they have their secondary affiliation to the management board in EU-level agencies. How strong these affiliations are influencing the representatives to adopt their role on the management board.

The first institutional variable I have chosen is institutionalization of the management board. The agencies have informal rules and norms the representatives more or less follows. Institutionalization takes time, and it can probably take longer time on these management boards since they are meeting few times a year. Representatives on the management board have to learn how the management operates, both formally and informally. The


understandings of how the management boards operate are influencing the representatives on their role perception.

The second institutional variable I have chosen is interaction on the management board. How much representatives participate in the board meetings will influence their role perception. There are both formal and informal rules of interaction on the management board and both have to be taken into consideration. How well the representatives know these rules of interaction are influencing the role representatives adopt.

1.3 Clarification of Research Question

The role perceptions representatives adopt on the management board in EU-level agencies are influenced by both organizational characteristics and institutional features. The two different theoretical approaches can help explaining variation in role perception on the management boards in EU-level agencies.

Figure 1.1:



There is an assumption of causality in this model. Different organizational characteristics and institutional features will lead to some variation of role perception that representatives will adopt on the management board. I will anticipate an ambiguous role, where the representatives have to balance the three different roles in a “double-hated” manner. Representatives have to balance the role they have in their domestic organization and the role they have on the management board.

There can be more than one factor that influences the role different representatives adopt, and there can be a mixture of role adopted. The representatives have to balance different role

expectations. It is also possible to find out if representatives actively define their role perception or if they are unaware of the role they adopt.

1.4 Method

I have chosen to use qualitative method on this study. Typically for this method are few units and many variables. This study is based on already existing studies on role perception and agencies at the EU-level. But there have not been any studies of the role perception of the representatives on the management boards in EU-level agencies. I have also used document analysis and I have used interview of representatives on management boards. I will interview four Norwegian representatives and one adviser to a Norwegian representative on the management boards.

Much of the empirical data in this study are from the interviews with the Norwegian representatives and the one adviser on the agencies management boards. This makes the interviews very important for the thesis and the foundation of the analysis. The information the interview objects give me will have a big impact on the thesis results.

I have chosen a case-study of five EU-level agencies and their management boards. The EU-level agencies I will study are; *EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency*, *ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control*, *EMA – European Medicines Agency*, *EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency* and *EUROFUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions*. The main reason for choosing these five agencies is because of accessibility to interview objects. The five agencies have Norwegian representatives on the management board which is a vital part of this study.

1.5 Earlier Studies

There have been few studies on EU-level agencies and role perception. The existing studies have been on agencies, and role perception in other EU institutions and committees, but not role perception of representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies. All scientific research is building on existing studies. This study will build on studies on EU-level agencies, role perception of national officials in EU institutions and representation in EU committees. I will also use studies on the concept of representation.

Madalina Busuioc and Martijn Groenleer have made a study on the behaviour of heads of EU-level agencies. They studied the autonomous powers of agency directors, the room for

manoeuvre over time and accountability. The conclusion was; “the limited but crucial role of EU agency heads” (Busuioc & Groenleer 2008: 26).

“The picture concerning the autonomy and accountability of EU directors is mixed” (Busuioc & Groenleer: 2008). There is limited room for agency director`s to manoeuvre. The directors have an independent status, but little autonomous power and their decisions and actions are confined by formal legal restrictions. Directors of EU agencies manage to “influence the priority setting for their agencies, not only through drafting work programme but also by putting forward proposals at board meetings” (Busuioc & Groenleer 2008: 27).

Morten Egeberg made a study of role perception of national officials in EU decision-making. Egeberg studied the role and identity perceptions of national officials involved in EU decision-making processes. “To what extent do they (national officials) replace or complement their national orientations? Under what conditions are supranational identities more likely to emerge?” (Egeberg 1998: 457). Through his empirical research he finds that loyalty shifts may take place, but only marginally. “Being embedded in EU level structures, separated in time and space from their primary institutional affiliations back home, officials tend to develop a sense of allegiances to the supranational level” (Egeberg 1998: 468). The roles they have in national institutions are not being replaced, but are more complementary and secondary.

Jarle Trondal and Frode Veggeland made a study on representatives of domestic civil servants in EU committees. This study confronts the “conflict between political loyalty and professional autonomy” (Trondal & Veggeland 2003:59). They observed that some adopted a supranational role more than others. The supranational role they adopted was a supplement to the existing role they have as national civil servants. Trondal and Veggeland used organizational affiliation as one of their variables in the same manner as I do. They use the representative’s primary affiliation in domestic institutions as important for their secondary affiliation in EU institutions. They are also using the same roles I have decided to use in my thesis.

In Jarle Trondal’s study of ambiguous representation of temporary officials in the European Commission concludes that temporary officials evoke a multiple representational role. Trondal argues that temporary officials are evoking a role perception which is a middle-ground between the intergovernmental and neo-functional notions of representation. One of the findings was that 65percent have fairly much or very much loyalty towards the

Commission as a whole, and 47 percent have fairly much or very much loyalty towards the member-states as a group and 88 percent have fairly much or very much professional neutrality within own position. (Trondal 2006: 9).

These studies are interesting for my study because they are studies of temporary officials in the EU system. I will study temporary officials in EU-level agencies, and I will then have the possibility to build my study on the existing studies of temporary officials working in the EU system. The earlier studies made on EU-level agencies can help me in the explanation of the institution the representatives are working in. I will also have the possibility to see if there are similarities in the role perception of representatives on EU-level agencies and role perception of representatives in other EU institutions.

1.6 EU-level Agencies and their Management Boards

Since the 1990s there has been a significant growth in EU-level agencies. Before the 1990s there were only two EU-level agencies; the Centre for Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFUND). These agencies were established as early as in the 1970s. After 1990 there have been established 33 more agencies, making the number 35 agencies in total.

The Commission reasons for establishing and use EU-level agencies are: “The main advantage of using the agencies is that their decision are based on purely technical evaluation of very high quality and are not influenced by political or contingent considerations” (Commission of the European Union 2002, p. 5).

“EU-level agencies are typically assigned a management board whose main function is to decide on the agency’s budget, the work programme, and to appoint its director general” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 13). There is no single way to organize these management boards, but all of them have some similarities. All management boards have at least one representative from each EU member state. The management boards are diverse in respect to both size and composition. Most of the EU-level agencies have a management board consisting of 20 to 50 representatives.

The most interesting for this study is the representative’s domestic organizational background; from which domestic organization they come from and have their primary affiliation to. This is based on the organizational variables I have chosen. The degree of institutionalization and

interaction on the management board are also important for the thesis, and important for what role the representatives adopt.

1.7 The Thesis Framework

I have divided the thesis into different chapters. The second chapter of the thesis I will present the theoretical framework for the analysis. It will concentrate on both the independent variables; organizational and institutional theory. It will discuss what the two theories can explain of variation in role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies. The second chapter will also give an introduction to the different roles representatives can have. The roles are taken from theoretical perspectives and have to be put in to context.

In chapter three I will present the method used in this study. I will explain why the use of the method, the use data and the cases I have chosen to study. It is important to present the method used in the thesis and the possible implication the method can have on the thesis.

In the fourth chapter I will introduce EU-level agencies and their management boards. The chapter will outline the agency's role in the European Union. What are their assignments, how do they function and what are their responsibilities? I will also introduce the five agencies I have chosen to study and their management boards.

Chapter five will concentrate on the organizational variables, domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation, and how these variables can explain variation in role perception on management board in EU-level agencies. The sixth chapter will concentrate on the institutional variables, institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board, and how this can explain variation in role perception on the management board.

The last chapter, chapter seven, will be a conclusion of the thesis. The main findings in the thesis will shortly be summarized and the conclusion of the hypotheses will be outlined. There will be answers to the predictions made in the thesis.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the analysis. The theoretical framework will establish a foundation to analyze variation of role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies. I have chosen to use organizational and institutional theory to explain some of the variation of role perception on the different management boards. There are many different factors within these theories that can explain the variation, but I have chosen the factors I mean can best explain the variation of role perception.

Organizational factors such as organizational structure, organizational demography and organizational affiliation can be factors from organizational theory that can explain some variation in role perception. In this study I have chosen to focus on domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation – primary versus secondary affiliation. The two characteristics from organizational theory are closely attached to each other; representatives have their primary affiliation to their domestic organization.

An institution is more than an organization; it is “infused with values” (Egeberg 2002: 6). Institutions consist of the same organizational factors as all organization, but there is more to an institution. Institutional factors such as informal rules and norms and interaction on the board can also explain variation in role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies. In this study I have chosen to focus on institutionalization of the board and interaction on board meetings. The two features from institutional theory are also closely attached. Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may be more familiar with the rules of interaction on the management board.

The different roles members can adopt may be influenced by both organizational and institutional factors. The supranational role emphasises that representatives on the management board have European interests in mind, and have their loyalties to the EU-level agency.

The intergovernmental role emphasises that representatives on the management board have their own nation state interests in mind. They are representatives on the management board to promote their nation state interests and have their loyalties to their domestic organization.

The expert role emphasises that representatives have professional autonomy. The role is not a political interest role, but an independent role focused on the best of the profession they represent.

It is also important to explain the concept of representation. All representatives on the management board are representing someone when attending the board meetings.

“Representation involves a relationship between the representative(s) and those represented” (Trondal & Veggeland 2006: 61).

2.2 The Concept of Representation

Representation is a concept which is important to explain in this study. All of the representatives are appointed to the management board and thus representing an organization, institution and/or member state on the management board. The majority of the representatives on the management boards are appointed by their member states. Heinz Eulau described that the term representation “directs attention first of all, to the attitudes, expectations and behaviours of the represented. As such, representation depends, amongst other things, on how it is conceived by the actors” (Trondal: 2006: 3).

All representatives on the management boards in EU-level agencies are *representing* their member state; this is because they are appointed by their nation state to the management board. The concept of representation can vary between two extremes (Trondal: 2006: 3). “At one extreme, representation means evoking representational roles that are closely and solely knit to constituents. On the other extreme, representation means having free will to evoke representational roles that may deviate from this default position” (Trondal 2006:3).

Representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies are appointed by the member states. They may therefore to a more or less degree represent the member states on the management board. This study will argue from the point of view that representatives may indirectly represent the member states interests, but they may not be very closely attached to the interests of the member states. The representatives may have a mandate from the member state to freely adopt a role perception that can deviate from national interests.

2.3 Role Perception

“It is important to study role perceptions because they may have a significant influence on human behaviour” (Trondal & Veggeland: 2003: 61). At the management board in the EU-

level agencies there are a majority of representatives from the member states. All member states have the right to be represented at the agencies management boards.

Since they are representatives from the member states it is possible that they are representing their own nation state interests. But there is also a possibility that they are adopting a more supranational role when they are attending at the management board, and are not representing their own nation state interests. The creation of EU-level institutions and agencies raises the question if there is a transfer of loyalties from the national level to the EU-level.

There is a relationship between the representatives and those they represent. “This relationship may be based on trust or enmity, on formal or informal rules, on shared notions of representative quality or on different notions of true representation” (Trondal & Veggeland: 2003: 61). The representatives may have some directives from their primary affiliation at home when they are attending at the management board in EU-level agencies. How strong these directives are depends on what their primary affiliation is; if they are receiving their directives from national ministries it is more likely they represent their nation state. Representatives from the Commission and the European Parliament may more likely represent European interests because these are two supranational institutions in the EU system.

The assumption is that representatives on management boards can adopt different roles and identities. “By “role” we usually mean a set of expectations, norms or rules, that more or less specify the desired behaviour of the role incumbent” (Egeberg: 1998: 458). Since representatives at management boards can adopt different roles and identities, it is important to find out what influences representatives to adopt the different roles. Are the representatives adopting a supranational role or are they keeping a national interest role in addition to their expertise on the policy field; the expert role.

“To say that individuals follow roles and identities is not to say that their behaviour is always easily predicted” (Egeberg: 1998: 458). Individuals may have a collection of roles, and it is then important to find out in which role the representatives have on the management board. “Roles, identities and situations can all be ambiguous” (Egeberg 1998: 458). To say that roles and identities can be ambiguous is that is not always clear what role or identity they have, and they can use aspect of different roles in their own role perception.

There are several reasons for choosing the role perceptions I have, and I may put forward the four most significant reasons. The first reason for choosing the roles that I have is that all representatives on the management boards have good knowledge and in one form or another are experts on the policy area. All representatives are also working permanent in a domestic organization or institution in their own nation state. The agencies are EU institution at the supranational level and the representatives are supposed to adopt a supranational role.

The second reason for choosing the role perceptions I have is because they are vastly different. The intergovernmental role and the supranational role are extremes on each side of the scale. The expert role is role which has professional autonomy in mind, and is not a political interest driven role. This may make it easier to see the difference in role perception on the management board between different representatives. It may also be easier to find out if there is large variation in the role perception on the management board.

The third reason is that we may see if the agencies are a supranational institution, as it is supposed to be, or if it is another intergovernmental arena for the member state to push for their own nation interests. The third possibility is that is an expert institution where professional autonomy and interests are dominating. Even if the representatives on the management boards have an intergovernmental role perception does not mean it is an intergovernmental institution, but it can be an arena for member states to present their interests.

2.3.1 The Supranational Role

Representatives on EU-level agencies, according to the supranational role, will pursue European interests which are beneficial for the whole European Union. When representatives are working in a supranational decision-making process over time, the loyalty may change and widen up their perspective to a larger territorial area; Europe.

EU- level agencies are supranational institutions which are supposed to have the interest of the whole EU in mind. When the management boards of EU-level agencies are meeting, the members are supposed to have a supranational role where they are representing the best of the “European people”.

In an earlier study by Scheinman and Feld found that “ten out of 23 interviewed national officials sensed that through their community experience they had adopted a more

“European” orientation then they had before” (Egeberg: 1998: 456). This shows that national officials can shift their role perception after working in a European context.

2.3.2 The Intergovernmental Role

Representatives on management boards in different EU-level Agencies may, according to the intergovernmental role perception, pursue the interest that benefits their own state. National interests exceed the interest of the whole European Union. Even if the agencies are independent from the main EU institutions the members may have their own states interests in mind.

The intergovernmental role “implies that “true representation” occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from their constituents” (Trondal & Veggeland 2003: 61). Representatives on the management boards are representing the member state that appointed them to the management board.

Representatives on the management board that evokes an intergovernmental role may see the EU-level agency as an intergovernmental arena where representatives are presenting their member state interests and are negotiating in a give and take mentality between the member states.

2.3.3 The Expert Role

The role perception as an expert in the agencies, members will have their profession interests in mind; their professional autonomy. The expert role is not a political interest driven role, it is an independent role and political interests are not the most important aspect. That is not to say it has no importance at all. They will work as independent expert to advance their profession and do what is best from a scientific point of view.

As Trondal and Veggeland describe it; the expert role is the idea of the “complete independence” of the representative (Trondal & Veggeland 2003: 62). “True representation” emerges when the representative has the possibility to deviate from the intergovernmental role. “Decisions are reached on the basis of arguments” (Trondal & Veggeland 2003: 62). The arguments that counts are scientific arguments grounded in scientific research. Political arguments are set aside as not valid.

EU-level agencies are advisory agencies supposed to give neutral scientific expert advice to the Commission, member-states and national agencies within the same policy area. Some of

the agencies have some regulative competences in some areas. EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) has some regulatory and executive task within their area of aviation safety.

2.4 Organizational Theory

Organizational theory has a long history and has been important for the understanding of organizations in different contexts. There have been many prominent organizational theorists and I will use Morten Egeberg to a large degree for the organizational framework in this study. He has made studies on organizational theory within the European Union context. “An organizational approach to European integration focuses on individual actors’ organizational context in order to account for their behaviour, interests and identities” (Egeberg: 2002: 1).

The representatives on management boards come from different domestic organizations. The organizational structures of these organizations are important to explain variation of role perception on management boards. Different organizational structures can influence to adopt different role perceptions. Representatives on the management boards will also have their primary affiliation to their national organizations. This may also influence their role perception in different ways. These two variables are closely connected, and can therefore be hard to clearly separate.

There are many organizational variables we can use to explain variation in role perception. In this study I will focus on domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation – primary versus secondary affiliation. I have chosen these variables because representatives on the management board are closely attached to their national organization or institution, and this may influence their role perception on the EU-level, and the representatives have their primary affiliation to the domestic organization or institution and may change their role when attending their secondary affiliation; the management board.

2.4.1 Domestic Organizational Structure

“An organizational structure is a normative structure composed of rules and roles specifying, more or less, who are expected to do what, and how” (Egeberg: 2002: 4). The organizational structure defines goals and interests that the organization or institution is to pursue.

“Normative structures forge information networks for the development of agendas, alternatives and learning” (Egeberg: 2002: 4). There is a “bounded rationality” in organizations because of the fact that decision-makers do not have the possibility to take a part in all at once, consider all possible alternatives and their consequences. There is then a

good match between the decision-maker need for simplification on one hand and the selection and filter that an organization provide on the other hand (Egeberg: 2002: 4).

The organizational structure of their organization or institution at home may influence the role perception on the management board in the EU-level agency. The different members on EU-level agency are permanent employees in national organizations with different organizational structures. Some are members of national ministries, some are members of national agencies, some are members of expert organizations like universities, some are members of non-governmental organization and EU institutions and some are.

The national organization may have different goals and interests the organization or institution is to pursue. A national ministry may have different goals then an expert organization, such as a university. The national ministry may have their own nation state interests to pursue, and the university have scientific and professional interests and goals to pursue.

I will focus on the goals and interests of the domestic organizational structure. This aspect is important for the role perception the representatives may adopt at the EU-level. The different domestic organizational goals and interests may influence the steer the member more or less in a direction when they are adopting a role on the management board.

I will also focus on the domestic organization possibility to instruct their representatives on the management board to present their view on the management board. The domestic organization may give instruction to their representatives before they attend meetings and thus have the possibility to influence the role perception of the representatives. The domestic organization may have some rules specifying how representatives are expected to behave when attending board meetings.

I predict representatives appointed from national ministries and national agencies may adopt an intergovernmental role perception on the management board. Representatives working in close relationship with their government are more likely to adopt a role where they are representing their goals and interests. I may also predict representatives appointed from sector specialized or expert organizations may adopt an expert role on the management board. Representatives working in expert organizations and institutions may more likely be preoccupied with professional autonomy and have less political loyalty to their government.

2.4.2 Organizational Affiliation

Organizational affiliation may influence the board members to adopt different role perceptions on the management board. I will focus on primary versus secondary affiliation. Representatives have their primary affiliation to their national organizations. Their secondary affiliation is to the EU-level agency and its management board. They are permanent employers in their national organization and may be more or less loyal to this organization. How strong this affiliation is may have some influence on the role perception they adopt on the management board.

Representatives with strong primary affiliations to government institutions may have more reason to adopt a role where they represent their government interests. Representatives with primary affiliation to sector specialized institutions may have more reason to adopt an expert role. Representatives with primary affiliation to expert organization may be more preoccupied with professional autonomy than political loyalty. They may also be freer to distance themselves from their primary affiliation and shift their loyalties to their secondary affiliation.

Representatives may after some time shift their loyalties from their primary affiliation to their secondary affiliation. The stronger the affiliation to the management board becomes the possibility for shift of loyalties may be more likely. Representatives may also be more conscious on the role they adopt when attending board meetings.

I predict strong primary affiliation to national ministries and national agencies may influence to an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who have strong primary affiliation and loyalty to their government may adopt a role where they are less attached and less loyalty to their secondary affiliation. I also predict that representatives with long time of service on the board may adopt a supranational role to their secondary affiliation; the management board. Representatives with a long time of service in a European context may more easily shift their loyalty to their secondary affiliation and adopt a supranational role on the management board.

2.5 Institutional Theory

I will use much of March and Olsen`s work on institutional theory to outlay the institutional framework in the thesis. They are well known for their studies within institutional theory and apply this to empirical cases. They have developed the of concept “logic of appropriateness” which I will use in this study.

Institutionalization of an organization takes time. Institutionalization means that “organisations are growing increasingly complex by adding informal norms and practices” (Egeberg: 2002: 6-7) over time. Over time an organization will be infused with values as Selznick argued (Egeberg: 2002: 7). To be an institution the organization has to have a value on its own and not only value in what it produces.

“An institution is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances” (March & Olsen: 2005: 1). An institution is more than an organization in that it has informal norms and rules that members of the institutions follow. Members follow these informal norms and rules because they are seen as natural and legitimate.

2.5.1 Institutionalization of the Management Board

Representatives of management boards in EU-level agencies will slowly be socialized in the in the institutionalized rules and norms of the agencies management boards. Over time there may come new informal rules and norms that representatives have to take into consideration when they operate in the agency. Within these informal rules and norms and the organizational structure there is a predictability of how members will act.

The management board meets only a few times a year, and this makes it more difficult to be well known with the institutionalized rules and norms. This is because institutionalization takes time, and informal rules and norms develop over time. I will take this into consideration throughout the thesis. Even if the management board is meeting only a few times a year, the institution as a whole may have some informal norms and rules, and they may affect the management board. The management board may also over time adopt informal norms and rules, and the representatives may adopt them into their role perception.

Socialization of the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board takes time, and therefore may length of service influence how well representatives know the institutionalized rules and norms. For longer they have been a member of the management board the more they are institutionalized. This may influence their role perception on the board. New board members may not know the institutionalized rules and norms of the board

and may not influence the role perception in the same way as those with long time of service on the management board.

Representatives on the management board have to identify them self with the informal rules and norms that are represented on the management board. On the different management boards there may be different informal norms and rules. How institutionalized the management board is may influence the different representatives role perception.

I predict representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt a supranational role. Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management boards formal and “how things are done” may more likely identify themselves with the management board, thus adopt a supranational role. I may also predict representatives who are less known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management may not identify themselves with the management boards.

2.5.2 Interaction on the Management Board

How much representatives on the management boards participate on board meetings may influence their role perception. I have anticipated that large degree of participation may influence to a supranational role, and little degree of participation may influence to an intergovernmental role.

“Institutions empower and constrain actors differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of appropriateness” (March & Olsen: 2005: 1). The logic of appropriateness perspective “sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized in to institutions” (March & Olsen: 2004: 1). The rules that members of an institution follows are followed because the rules are seen as “natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” (March & Olsen: 2004: 1).

The interaction on the management board is likely to be more or less extent driven by rules of appropriateness. There are both specific rules for interaction and there are more informal norms and rules for how members interact on the management board; *exemplary behaviour*. To behave appropriate to the formal and informal norms and rules are important and may be a factor in adopting roles on the management board.

When representatives participate on the management board the argument they use may be important to establish what role representatives adopt. When representatives are presenting their point of view they may present their arguments rooted in national interests, scientific research or European interests. Arguments used may say something about the role representatives adopt on the management board.

I predict large degree of interaction on the management board may influence to a supranational role perception on the management board. Representatives who are active and participate on the management board knows what is acceptable on the board meetings. The more the representatives interact on the management board the more they may identify with the agency. I may also predict representatives with little degree of interaction on the management board may influence to an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less active and participate less may more likely involve themselves when national interests are at stake.

2.6 Hypotheses

From the theoretical framework I will present four hypotheses. The four hypotheses will derive from the four variables I have chosen; domestic organizational structure, organizational affiliation, institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board. The four variables may influence in different degree and direction so the representatives may adopt a role perception where they have to balance the three different roles; an ambiguous role perception.

H₁: Representatives appointed from national ministries and national agencies may adopt an intergovernmental role perception on the management board. Representatives working in close relationship with their government may be more likely to adopt a role where they are representing their goals and interests. Representatives appointed from sector specialized or expert organizations may adopt an expert role on the management board. Representatives working in more scientific environment may more likely be preoccupied with professional autonomy and have less political loyalty to their government.

H₂: Representatives who have a strong primary affiliation to national ministries and national agencies may be influenced to an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who have strong primary affiliation and loyalty to their

government may adopt a role where they are less attached and less loyalty to their secondary affiliation. Representatives with long time of service on the board may adopt a supranational role to their secondary affiliation; the management board. Representatives with a long time of service in a European context may more easily shift their loyalty to their secondary affiliation and adopt a supranational role on the management board.

H₃: Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt a supranational role. Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management boards and “how things are done” may more likely identify with the management board, thus adopt a supranational role. Representatives who are less known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less known with the formal and informal rules and norms may not identify themselves with the management boards.

H₄: Representatives who have a large degree of interaction on the management board may be influenced to a supranational role perception on the management board. Representatives who are active and participate on the management board knows what is acceptable behaviour on the board meetings. The more the representatives interact on the management board the more likely they may identify with the agency, and work for the best of the agency and the whole of EU. Representatives with little degree of interaction on the management board may influence to an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less active and participate less may more likely involve themselves when national interests are at stake, and argue with national interests arguments.

2.7 Mutual Exclusive Theories?

The two theories I have chosen to explain variation in role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies, organizational and institutional, can explain some variation exclusively. Specific organizational structure and organizational affiliation can explain why some representatives adopt the role perception they have.

The institutionalization of management board members can explain other role perception members may adopt. The more they are institutionalized the stronger it may influence the role

perception. The intensity of interaction in meetings can also exclusively explain some variation on the management board.

The two theories can separately explain narrow empirical examples. But to explain a complex world and complex role perception it is more fruitful to supplement the two theories. The two theories can supplement each other in the explanation of role perception on EU-level agencies. The combination of organizational affiliation and strong institutionalization can explain a different role perception than a combination of organizational affiliation and weak institutionalization. The same can a combination of long agency experience and much interaction in meetings can explain one role perception than a combination of little agency experience and little interaction in meetings.

The different role perceptions I have chosen to study are not mutual exclusive either. There can be different combination of roles adopted on the management boards in EU-level agencies. There can be a combination of both the intergovernmental role and the expert role and the supranational role and the expert role. It is very little possibility for a combination of the supranational role and the intergovernmental role, if not impossible.

3. Methodology and Data

3.1 Introduction

The choice of method is to a large degree decided by the research question. The research question is a hypothetic deductive, where I will use theory to explain an empirical phenomenon. I have chosen to study variation of role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies, and it is difficult to measure role perception. On the basis of the research question and the phenomenon I have chosen to use a *qualitative case-study* to study the phenomenon of role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies.

I have chosen a case-study of five different EU-level agencies and their management boards. The agencies I have chosen are EASA, ECDC, EMEA, EMSA and EUROFOUND and the role perception of the representatives on these management boards. The selection of case has been made on the basis of Norwegian representation on the management boards, comparison of the agencies and management boards, and access to data.

I have chosen three main sources of data; primary literature, secondary literature and interviews. Different sources of data are important to get a good overall picture of the phenomenon. Different data can give different perspective on the case and can supplement each other in the explanation of the phenomenon.

By using a case-study there are considerations to be taken. These considerations are the possibility for generalization, validity and reliability and ethical considerations. It is also important to have some source criticism, in particular to the oral sources: the interviews. It is important to filter out the information which is relevant from the information that is not relevant.

3.2 Case-study of Five Management Boards in EU-level Agencies

Bruce L. Berg defines case-study as “a method involving systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the research to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions” (Berg: 2007: 283). A case-study can provide a deep understanding of a phenomenon. The phenomenon I am interesting in is role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies.

“The scientific benefit of the case study method lies in its ability to open the way for discoveries” (Berg: 2007: 294). It can make discoveries for insight and new hypotheses to be

pursued in later studies on the subject. This can be the case in my study since there is still lacking research on role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies.

3.2.1 Selection of Case

I have chosen to do a case-study of representatives on five management boards in EU-level agencies. The five cases I have chosen are EASA, ECDC, EMEA, EMSA and EUROFOUND. On these management boards there are from 35 representatives to 87 representatives.

There are several reasons for choosing these five agencies. *First*, these five agencies have Norwegian representation on the management boards. It is these representatives I will interview to collect parts of the data used in the thesis. *Second*, by using five different agencies I will find more robust data than if I had used fewer agencies. *Third*, by using five different agencies there is a possibility to compare the different management boards, and see if there is variation between them. *Fourth*, it was agencies with easy access to information and data and representatives to interview. It was possible to get access to information on other agencies too, but I had to make a choice.

3.3 Use of Data

There will be used Primary sources “involve the oral or written testimony of eyewitnesses” (Berg: 2007: 268). These sources are original artefacts, documents, and items directly related to the outcome of an event or experience (Berg: 2007: 268). Mine primary sources will be interview with Norwegian representatives on the different management boards. I will also use official documents from the European Union; this includes the official documents on the establishment of the agencies. In these official documents there are specific regulations for the agencies. The most important from these official documents for my thesis is the regulation of the management board; its composition and competences.

The intention was to interview one representative on each management board from Norway. This was not possible, but on four of the management boards I interviewed the Norwegian representative, and on one management board I interviewed an adviser to the Norwegian representative.

In Bergs book on qualitative method she presents three forms of interview; the standardized interview, the semi-standardized interview and the un-standardized interview (Berg: 2007:

92). I have chosen the semi-standardized interview, which lies between standardized and un-standardized interview. Some characteristics for this type of interview are that it is “more or less structured, wording of questions are flexible, level of language may be adjusted and interviewer may answer questions and make clarifications” (Berg: 2007: 93).

The question will evolve around some specific themes that will give me answers that I can use and extract the most important information for the thesis. The themes I will concentrate on are:

- **The interview objects background;** how they were appointed and for how long they have been a member of the management board.
- **The work on the management board;** if there is much preparation before the board meetings and if they get instruction from their domestic organization.
- **The interview objects role on the management board;** if they have a conscious relationship to the role they adopt on the management board and if they change their role when attending meetings.
- **The other representatives on the management board;** are the other representatives conscious on their role on the management board and who they represent.
- **Informal rules and norms on the management boards;** do the representatives know of informal rules and norms on the management board and the implication of them.
- **The discussion procedure on the management board;** is the discussion formal or informal, which representatives are active and who has control in the meetings.
- **Arguments used in the discussion;** scientific/expert arguments, national interest arguments or European interest arguments.

“Secondary sources involve the oral or written testimony of people not immediately present at the time of a given event” (Berg: 2007: 269). These are sources are written documents or created objects by others related to a specific research question (Berg: 2007: 269). These sources represent second-hand information of events or developments. I will use existing studies on role perception and studies on EU-level agencies as secondary sources.

The secondary sources will be used as building blocks for this study. All scientific research is built on existing scientific research, and this will make the ground work for my thesis. There

is no existing research on the theme of this study, but there have been made studies on the same phenomenon in different context close to the context I am going to study role perception.

3.4 Validity, Reliability and Generalization

In qualitative research will concepts like reliability and validity be substituted with trustworthiness and verifiable. When it comes to trustworthiness there has been an open procedure and in a way where it is possible to re-test the data collected. The interviews have been taped and are possible to verify. My assessment is that the validity or trustworthiness to the thesis` data is satisfactory.

It is not always necessary to ask the question of generalization in the use of case-studies. There is a clear scientific value to study some single category of individual, group or event. To understand role perception of representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies have a value on its own. Generalization is still important if the study has an intention of generalization.

If the case-study is properly undertaken, it should be able to generalize to similar individual, group or event. If my case-study is properly done, there is a possibility to generalize to other management boards in EU-level agencies. This is not to say that an explanation for why one representative adopts a supranational role immediately explains us why *all* of the representatives that are adopting a supranational role (Berg: 2007: 295). What it does is suggesting an explanation why other representatives are likely to adopt a supranational role. “The logic behind this has to do with the fact that few human behaviours are unique, idiosyncratic, and spontaneous” (Berg: 2007: 296-296).

To generalize to other management boards in other organizations or institutions on the EU-level, or management boards in general, is more problematic. There are some specific features with these management boards, and cannot be generalized to management boards in general. This is not the goal of this study either.

3.5 Source Criticism and Limitations

It is important to have some kind of source criticism to the sources I use in this study. It is important to know that the sources used are valid, reliable and relevant. The most problematic in this study is the use of interview.

I have interviewed four Norwegian representatives, and one adviser to a Norwegian representative. This can be a problem for the thesis. The fact that I am only interviewing one representative and adviser on each management board can make a false picture of which roles representatives adopt. I will not be able to collaborate what they are saying with others on the board. Norwegian representatives can also have a different view on the representatives and their role perception, representatives from other countries can have different views on the role perception of the representatives.

The use of existing research on role perception and EU-level agencies can also make a false picture of the role perception on EU-level agencies. There has been made studies on role perception in other EU institutions and committees, and there has been made a study on directors of EU-level agencies. It can be problematic to assert that role perception in EU institutions and committees will be same on management boards in EU-level agencies. It has to be made clear that role perception on management boards in EU-level agencies may be different from role perception in other EU institutions and committees.

Resource access was the largest reason for the limitations in this study. Resources such as time and money influenced the choices I had to make during the work process. I had to limit the number of interviews and the number of agencies in the study. But I will also say the limitations done in the thesis are not going to largely influence the results.

There are some limitations to this study. I am only studying five out of thirty-five EU-level agencies. This is not a significant amount, but I am confident that I will find some very interesting results from the research made. This is a case-study which is concentrating on a few agencies and their management boards. The resources available did not allow me to do a larger research with a higher number on agencies.

All the limitations of the thesis are taken into consideration during the thesis and analysis of the data. I do not think it will affect the results of the thesis in a large way, but it can make it hard to generalize.

3.6 Ethical Considerations

“Researchers must ensure the rights, privacy, and welfare of the people and communities that form the focus of their studies” (Berg: 2007: 53). Methods of data collection have become more sophisticated and penetrating, and thus the extent or scope of research has expanded.

“To a large extent concerns about research ethics revolve around various issues of harm, consent, privacy, and the confidentiality of data” (Berg: 2007: 53).

All my interview objects have given their consent to be interviewed. I have given them a description of what I am studying and why. They had the possibility to not answer questions if they felt it was not important or relevant for the study.

The interview objects are promised to be anonymous as far as it is possible. It is not possible to 100 per cent sure of anonymity, but I will not be using name in my thesis, and that is the strict definition of anonymity. The interview objects are also told that the conversation will be taped.

I will also only use information from my interview objects which is relevant for the study, other information will be filtered out. This is a very subjective exercise, and I have to decide on my own what is relevant and what is not relevant.

4. EU-level Agencies and Their Management Boards

4.1 Introduction

This study is concentrating on the representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies and variation in the role perception they adopt on the board. Do the members adopt an expert role, a supranational role, an intergovernmental role or a combination of two or three roles? What is it that influences different members to play the role they are playing? In this chapter I will look at EU-level agencies in general and their management boards. I will also look at the agencies I have chosen to study; EASA, ECDC, EMEA, EMSA and EUROFOUND.

It is important to understand the agencies I am studying, and what their role is in the EU system. Different agencies have different areas of expertise and have different responsibilities on the area. Some agencies can have regulative competences and some have purely advisory tasks.

The different agencies can be different and can help explain variation of role perception on the management boards. The composition, the number of representatives, the age, their tasks and purpose of the agencies can help explain some of the variation of the role perception. Some boards can have many representatives on the board and others can have few, some of the agencies are very young and some are old, their tasks can be very different and their purpose can be vastly different.

4.2 EU-level Agencies

Since the 1990s there has been a significant growth in EU-level agencies. Before the 1990s there were only two EU-level agencies; the Centre for Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (EUROFUND). These agencies were established as early as in the 1970s. After 1990 there have been established 33 more agencies, making the number 35 agencies in total.

Twenty-nine of the EU-level agencies are “community agencies” and twenty-three is located in the first pillar; the community pillar (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 584). It is the European Community (EC) and European Economic Area (EEA) which are located in the first pillar. The Commission has an exclusive initiative-role and monitoring the

implementation of policies within the first pillar. The Commission is one of the EU institutions that can establish EU-level agencies.

The Commission reasons for establishing and use EU-level agencies are: “The main advantage of using the agencies is that their decision are based on purely technical evaluation of very high quality and are not influenced by political or contingent considerations” (Commission of the European Union 2002, p. 5). In many cases the Commission transfers action capacity to a new centre at the supranational level.

Agencies at the EU-level are expert agencies which are independent from the political process. “EU-level agencies perform specialized advisory tasks, formulating non-binding opinions and soft policy instruments such as best manufacturing practices and regulatory information addressed to national authorities, firms and consumers” (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 584).

The EU-level agencies are not only gathering information within their area of expertise. The agencies are also actively formulating *implementation guidelines* for member states to use in their implementation of new EU-policies (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 3). In comparison to the Commission reasons, Trondal shows that the agencies are tasks expanding, and have expanded their tasks to other areas such as implementation guidelines.

The transfer of action capacity is rooted in the principal-agent approach. The agent (the Commission) transfer tasks to be solved by the principal (the agencies). The Commission delegates responsibility to the agencies to resolve tasks that are not highly political, but rather information-gathering, expert advisory tasks and give information to national authorities, firms and consumers (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler: 2007: 585).

The principal-agent approach is not the only reason to delegate responsibility to EU-level agencies. The decision to create EU-level agencies can be explained by circumstances of the moment or crisis that accurse. “The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is one case in point as it was established after the dioxin incident in Belgium and the BSE affair in Britain” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 17).

Another way to explain the creation of EU-level agencies is to see it as a *trend* within the realms of public management (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 17). In the 1990s, when there was a big increase of agency creation, was the period when New Public Management where popular in the member states of the EU. NPM was a trend that suggested smaller

government and outsource some government tasks to the private sector. The importance of cultural rules within wider institutional environments is emphasized by Meyer and Rowan and takes form of “rationalized myths” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 17). “They are myths because they are widely held beliefs whose effects inhere, not in fact that individuals believe them, but in the fact that they “know” everyone else does, and thus that for all practical purposes the myths are true” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 17-18).

There is also an institutional approach to the creation of EU-level agencies. The institutional approach “ascribes an autonomous role for institutions and organizational factors that goes beyond functional needs and environmental determinism” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 18). An assumption is that “EU-level agencies tend to come about through power struggles and compromises conditioned by existing institutional orders rather than “popping up” more or less automatically as a pure codification of functional needs” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 20).

Justification for EU-level agencies is “based on elements of output-legitimacy and the substantial credibility of policy making” (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 586). Over time there has been a politicization of the Commission and the policy making, so the creation of EU-level agencies is a tool to secure the regulatory commitment of the member states. The EU-level agencies are expected to fulfil regulatory goals which are in the public interest better than the EU institutions. The reason is that they are not directly chosen by voters, they are not affected by changes of personnel in EU institutions or influenced by powerful interest groups (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 585-586).

We can also see the EU-level agencies as regulatory networks that include national authorities, scientific communities, private enterprises and civil society organizations (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 587). The inclusion of both private and public sector from different levels of government favours decision-making rules and processes which favours consensus and exchange of knowledge. *“Especially in fields of regulation with a high need for coordination between national authorities and contested knowledge claims within the scientific community, the achievement of output-legitimacy through effective regulation may be dependent on the integrative and consensus-oriented function of regulatory networks on the input-side of the policy-making process”* (Borras, Koutalakis & Wendler 2007: 587).

The use of scientific experts in the decision-making process has been by scholars acknowledged to challenge the principles and practice of liberal democracies. The EU-level

agencies are composed by both expert representatives and governments representatives, but the role of experts are growing because of issues are complex and need expert advice.

4.3 The Management Boards

“EU-level agencies are typically assigned a management board whose main function is to decide on the agency’s budget, the work programme, and to appoint its director general” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 13). There is no single way to organize these management boards. The management boards are diverse in respect to both size and composition. Most of the EU-level agencies have a management board consisting of 27 to 50 members.

“The typical management board consists of 32 representatives, including 27 member-state representatives, two Commission representatives, and three “other” members” (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 14). From this we can see that the majority of the representatives derive from member states and the minority of the representatives from the Commission and other institutions. Over the time the European Parliament has increased their power, and as a consequence it has aspiration to influence the agency design and be represented in the management board. However, at the time the EP is only represented in 18 percent of the management board. In 50 percent of the management boards there are representatives from industries, interest organisations and research institutes. They are both members and observers on the management boards in EU-level agencies. (Egeberg, Martens & Trondal 2009: 14).

The different management board has specific regulations, rules and procedures for how they are operating and what their competences are. These regulations are laid down when the agency was created. The regulations, rules and procedures are very specific and it contains among other things how members are appointed to the management board, the composition of the management board, what powers the management board has and the voting rules of the management board.

4.3.1 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency

The EASA was created in 2003 by the European Parliament and the Council. “The European Aviation Safety is an agency of the European Union which has been given specific regulatory and executive tasks in the field of aviation safety” (www.easa.europa.eu). The agency is vital for maintaining a high uniform of civil aviation safety in Europe. Some of the main tasks the agency has are a) rulemaking for aviation safety legislation, b) standardisation to uniform

implementation of European aviation safety legislation in all member states and c) analysis and research to improve aviation safety (www.easa.europa.eu).

“In order to ensure that decisions on safety issues are free from all political interference, decisions must be in the hands of a neutral and independent decision maker invested with the necessary powers” (www.easa.europa.eu). For this reason is it the executive director that takes the final decision on aviation safety.

The management board has representatives from the member states, the Commission and EEA/EFTA countries. The management board is responsible for adopting the agency’s budget and work programme (www.easa.europa.eu). The EASA has also cooperation with countries outside Europe; United States, Canada, Russia, Brazil, Israel and China. The cooperation with organisations in these countries aims to harmonize aviation safety world-wide.

The agency has to ordinary meetings twice a year and it can meet on the behalf of the chairperson request or on the request of one-third of the management board members. The agency can invite any person with relevant knowledge as an observant. The members of the management board can also be assisted by an adviser or an expert. “The management board shall take its decisions by a two-third majority of its members” (REGULATION (EC) No 216/2008). It is only members from the member states, the Commission and the Parliament that has the right to vote, the executive director and the observant cannot vote.

“The management board shall establish an advisory body of interested parties, which it shall consult prior to making decisions in some areas” (REGULATION (EC) No 216/2008). The management board can also consult the advisory body on other matters, but they are not bounded by the opinion they give. The management board can also establish other working bodies to carry out functions of the management board, including the preparation of its decisions and the implementation of its decisions.

4.3.2 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

The ECDC “is an EU agency with aim to strengthen Europe’s defences against infectious diseases” (www.ecdc.europa.eu). The agency was established in 2004 and has its seat in Sweden. To achieve the agency goals it is working together with national health protection bodies across Europe. ECDC is pooling European knowledge on disease prevention and control from all national experts that are represented in the agency.

“The management board is composed of one member designated by each member state, two members designated by the European Parliament and three members representing and appointed by the Commission” (www.ecdc.europa.eu). The management board can also invite observant whose interests can be of interests to attend meetings. Representatives from countries that have agreements whit the EU are entitled to attend meetings, but are not allowed to vote. Other countries can also be invited if the items on the agenda are of particular interests of these countries.

“The Centre shall be managed by its director, who shall be completely independent in the performance in his/her duties, without prejudice to the representative competencies of the Commission and the management board” (REGULATION (EC) No 851/2004). The director is appointed by the management board of list proposed by the Commission. The director is appointed for a period of five years and a possibility for an extension of one more period of five years.

The management board have to elect a Chair and a Deputy Chair among its members with a two-third majority. The Chair has a two year period, with a possibility of extended period, before a new chair is elected. The Chair is the spokesman of the management board. The Deputy Chair takes over if the Chair is unable to participate.

The board representatives are chosen to secure the highest standards of competences and the best expertise on the area. They representatives have four years term and have the possibility to be extended. All representatives shall have a nominated alternate to take their place if they are not able to meet on the management board. The management board is meeting at least twice a year and more if one-third of the board representatives request it.

4.3.3 EMEA – European Medicines Agency

“The mission of the European Medicines Agency is to foster scientific excellence in the evaluation and supervision of medicines, for the benefit of public and animal health” (www.emea.europa.eu). The EMEA is a very science based agency. The agency is responsible for coordination of existing scientific resources for disposal for member states to evaluate and supervise.

The agency is working with both the EU member states and the Commission in a European medicines network. The agency is working to provide “independent, science-based

recommendations on the quality, safety and efficacy of medicines and on more general issues relevant to public and animal health that involve medicines” (www.emea.europa.eu).

The management board has 38 representatives on the management boards. 27 from each member state, two from the Commission, two from the European Parliament, three observant from the EEA/EFTA countries and there are four representatives from non-governmental organizations. The management board shall have meetings at least twice a year.

The agency is run by the executive director and is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the agency. The executive director shall be appointed by the management board, on a proposal from the Commission. Representatives will be appointed for a period of five years, and it can be renewed once for a five-year period.

“The members of the management board shall be appointed in such a way as to guarantee the highest levels of specialist qualifications, a broad spectrum of relevant expertise and the broadest possible geographical spread within the European Union” (REGULATION (EC) No 726/2004). The board members are appointed for a period of three years. Decisions made on the management board have to have a two-third majority to pass.

4.3.4 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency

European Maritime Safety Agency was established in 2002 “in the aftermath of the Erika disaster” (www.emsa.europa.eu). Erika was an oil tanker which sank outside the French coast in 1999. The main goal of the agency is to “contribute to the enhancement of the overall maritime safety system in the Community. Its goals are, through its tasks, to reduce the risk of maritime accidents, marine pollution from ships and the loss of human lives at sea” (www.emsa.europa.eu).

The agency is supposed to give the Commission technical and scientific advice in the field of maritime safety. EMSA are doing this through the “continuous process of updating and developing new legislation, monitoring its implementation and evaluating the effectiveness of the measures in place” (www.emsa.europa.eu). The agency is doing this in close cooperation with the member states.

EMSA's management board consists of 37 representatives. There is one from each EU member state, four from the Commission, four professionals from the sectors most concerned and two from the EEA countries. The four professionals are nominated by the Commission. The

management board can also invite persons whose opinion can be of interest. The representatives are appointed for a period of five years, and it is possible to renew the term once (REGULATION (EC) No 1406/2002).

The management board has ordinary meetings twice a year. In addition can the Commission can initiate meetings, and if one-third of the management board request it. The management board takes its decisions by a two-third majority of all members with the right to vote (REGULATION (EC) No 1406/2002). Each member state has one vote each.

4.3.5 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

EUROFOUND was established in 1975 by the European Council “to contribute to the planning and establishment of better living and working conditions in Europe” (www.eurofound.europa.eu). The office is placed in Dublin, Ireland. The agency has three areas of expertise which they are working on; working conditions, living conditions and industrial relations. The agency’s role is “to provide information, advice and expertise for key actors in the field of EU social policy on the basis of comparative, research and analysis” (www.eurofound.europa.eu).

EUROFOUND has a very large management board. It has about 87 members, and it is organized different then the other management boards. It has three from each member state; one from the government, one from the employers` union and one from the employees` organization. Representatives on the management board are appointed for a period of three years, and it is possible for a new period.

“Within the [management board], the representatives of governments, employees` organizations and employers` organizations shall each form a group. Each group shall designate a coordinator who will take part in the meetings of the [management board]. The coordinators of the employee`s and employers` groups shall be representatives of their respective organizations at European level” (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1111/2005).

They call this way of organizing the management board a tripartite representation. “The maintenance of the tripartite representation from each member state ensures that all major stakeholders are involved and that account is taken of the diversity of interests and approaches which characterise social issues” (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1111/2005).

5. The Influence of Organizational Characteristics

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on analysing domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation of the representatives on the management boards in the five EU-level agencies I have chosen to study; EASA, ECDC, EMEA, EMSA and EUROFOUND. To find out which organizational characteristics that can influence role perception on management boards, we have to find relevant organizational characteristics in their domestic organizational structure and their primary affiliation.

How many of the members come from national ministries, national agencies, expert organizations and non-governmental organizations? Which domestic organization they come from will have an influence on the role perception they adopt on the management board. The members will then have their primary affiliation to this organization, and the primary affiliation will influence their role perception.

I will first make a clear distinction between the different organizations the representatives can come from. The different organizations have different organizational structure and can influence representatives in different ways. It is also to the domestic organization the representatives have their primary affiliation to.

The different organizations the representatives can come from are national ministries, national agencies, expert organizations and non-governmental organizations. Some of the representatives come from the Commission and the European Parliament. These different organizations have different goals and interests to pursue. I have anticipated that domestic organizational structure will influence the role perception of representatives on the management board.

I have decided to analyse one agency at the time. This is because to make a distinction between the agencies and differences between them. I will also argue that this way of organizing the analysis is most organized. At the end of the chapter I will have an overall analysis of the agencies according to the two organizational variables. I will also at the end try to answer the hypotheses I put forward.

5.2 Domestic Organizations and Their Organizational Structure

National ministries have as their prime goal to represent national interests when they are representing the nation state on the international stage. The national ministry goal is different from nation to nation and there will then be some interest conflict when they are meeting in international forums. National ministries have the Council as their main institution in the EU. There are all EU members national ministries represented dependent on the area they are discussing. This is a mainly intergovernmental institution in the EU system.

National agencies are created by national ministries. They are delivered clear and concise goals, but the ministry should only minimally interfere in the agencies pursuit of these goals (Martens: 2005: 31). As we can see; the national agencies are connected to their mother ministry, and are receiving goals to pursue from the mother ministry. National ministries and national agencies are both closely related to national goals and interests.

Expert organizations such as universities and research centres are relatively independent from national governments. Their goals and interests are in scientific research and development. They are not steered by national or European interests, only scientific progress and integrity.

Non-governmental organizations such as employees` and employers` organizations are usually working for rights for a specific group. They are not related to national government interests, but are working for the interests of the group they are representing. Their goal is to enhance the rights of the group they represent.

The different organizational structure, goals and interests, the representatives come from are vastly different. Representatives from the different organizations have their primary affiliation to this organization. It is natural to believe that representatives from these organizations will represent their interests on the management board. Their secondary affiliation is to the management board, and will not have the same impact on the representative as their primary affiliation.

5.3 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency

The EASA management boards have 41 members. There are 27 from the EU member states, three from the Commission and eleven observant. There are no representatives from the European Parliament on EASAs management board. In 2008 the management board met four times. The EASA is one of the agencies which have regulative competences in some areas. It

has regulative competences when it comes to “safety and environmental type-certification of aircraft, engines and parts” (www.easa.europa.eu).

I did not have the possibility to interview the Norwegian representative on the management board, but I interviewed one of his advisers. He is represented in all the meetings with the Norwegian representatives and I decided that the adviser have the knowledge and information to answer the questions I had for the Norwegian representative.

The representatives on the management board in EASA come from different national or EU institutions with different organizational structure. The majority of the members come from national agencies or national ministries. There are also three members from the Commission. In EASA there are very few members from purely expert organization, but we can assume that national agencies are not in the same degree attached to national interests in the same way members from national ministry. National agencies lie under a national ministry, and are getting some instruction from the ministry but are supposed to be independent at the same time. Representatives from the Commission come from a different organizational structure then representatives from national ministries and national agencies.

The composition of the EASA management board gives the assumption that representatives will adopt an intergovernmental role in addition to the expert role. The majority are from national agencies and ministries, and have good knowledge on the area.

The Norwegian representative was appointed by the Norwegian aviation agency. *“I am appointed as the Norwegian representative on the management board by the Norwegian aviation agency (Luftfartsverket). The normal thing is that the director of the aviation agency is appointed to the management board. The alternate, when the main representative does not have the possibility to attend, is department director of the ministry of transport and communications”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative has been a member of the management board since 2006. The interview object said the Norwegian representative represented Norway on the management board; *“He is representing Norway when he is attending the board meetings, I would say. He is representing Norway in the same way the other representatives are representing their member state. He is not attending these meeting as an expert on the area. He is attending as a EASA member state, Norway is a full member of the EASA agency”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative has much preparation before the management board meetings. *“There is a lot of preparation before the board meetings. I am, the adviser, doing much of the preparatory work for the meetings. It is go through all the case documents and write a commentated agenda. There is quite a lot of paper work before these meetings. Then it is to, if necessary, to discuss the commentated agenda. Some cases need more discussion than others. The commentated agenda is often good enough before the meetings. We do have a evening session before the meeting to clarify some of the questions”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The interview object also said they are standing relatively free from their national organization. *“We stand relatively free from the domestic organization. There are naturally some national interests to attend, but at the same time shall the management board be very focused on the agency`s best. If there is conflicting interests between national interests and EASA interests the roles are put on the edge”* (Interview: Author`s translation). The representatives on the management boards are there to help EASA first and foremost, and not promote instructions from their domestic organization.

There are also many representatives with expert background. *“They are representing their member state, but they have a background as experts on the policy field. “The representatives have a strong affiliation to their government, but they have no party-political agenda, not an agenda to pursue national interests. The representatives are more interested in advancing the work of the agency, and develop further cooperation between EASA and national authority”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The agency is receiving reports on accidents and incidents from national aviation agencies. The in-house experts analysis and presents these on the management board. *“You can say the agency extracts on its own competence. The agency has now 450 employers. It is not unusual that in addition to the agency directors, top-directors that have to attend, that expert on different areas is holding briefing on different subjects. For example the agency is largely involved in research and there have been research presentations on the management board. It has been presentations of on the issue of reporting accidents and incidents by experts on the management board”* (Interview: Author`s translation). The management board are interesting in research on aviation safety and cooperation between national authorities and EASA.

Most of the EASA management board members have their primary affiliation to national ministry or national agencies. This may influence the members to adopt an intergovernmental role perception on the management board. Their affiliation to national ministries and agencies

can make the members represent their interests. The members can act on instruction from their primary affiliation.

This makes a conflict between primary and secondary affiliation. Their secondary affiliation, the management board, is a supranational institution and is supposed to work for the interest of the whole EU. When there is such a majority of members from national ministry and national agencies there is a high possibility for many of them represent their own nation interests.

The management boards know the representatives come from different organizations and have their primary affiliation to the domestic organizations. The interview object said they had discussed the role perception on the management board. *“We have talked a bit about it. It has also been a subject on the management board. This is a management board that are going to have EASAs best at heart, and this has come from the Commission”* (Interview: Author`s translation). There are other arenas to pursue national interests, did the interview object say.

The interview object also said that other representatives are conscious when it comes to their role perception on the management board. *“I will say so. It is very constructive...”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

Either domestic organizational structure or primary affiliation to their domestic organizations, which primarily is national agencies or ministries, is influencing the representatives to adopt an intergovernmental role. They have strong affiliation to their government but are adopting a supranational role on the management board. As the interview object told me, the representatives are working for the best of the agency.

It seems they are adopting a supranational role and shifts loyalties from their primary affiliation to their secondary affiliation. They are doing this even as they know they are representing their member state. When they are meeting on the management board they are conscious to take on a different role then at their domestic organization.

5.4 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

The ECDC management board has 30 members. There are 27 from each member state, three observant, three members representing the Commission and two members representing the European Parliament. The three observant are from the EEA/EFTA countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In 2008 the management board met three times.

I interviewed the Norwegian representative on the management board, and the interview object is employed in the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services. The Norwegian representative has been a member of the management board since the agency was created in 2004.

The ECDC management boards have a more variation between members from national ministries, national agencies and expert organizations than EASA. There is a majority from national ministries and national agencies, but there are a few members from expert organizations. There are also members from the Commission and the Parliament. The interview object said there is about half with the same background as him, and there are some from experts from other health related institutions. Some member states have also appointed representatives from educational institutions.

The Norwegian representative was appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services. *“I was appointed by the ministry and was accepted. When the agency was established there was a question if Norway should be a member of the agency. It was a case for the government to decide if Norway should be a member. We got the possibility to appoint one representative on the management board. Norway is taking part in financing the agency. I was appointed as the Norwegian representative and have been there from the start”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

When the Norwegian representative is attending meetings in the EU agency he is representing both Norway and the policy field as an expert. *“I represent both the policy field and the ministry/Norway on the management board. One of the reasons he was appointed was because of his knowledge and experience on the policy field. I am working on the same cases in my domestic organization as I do on the ECDC management board; prevent infectious diseases. In this way I am representing both the policy area and Norway”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative said there was much documents to read to be prepared for the meetings on the management boards. *“There is a lot of documents and much to read. I am receiving these documents a week ahead, and I usually read them the weekend before. I am deciding if there are cases that has to be discussed within the secretary or other health institutions”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative does not get instruction from the domestic organization. *“I am not receiving instruction from my domestic organization, only in modest degree. There might be cases where I have to receive instruction in a way, but that is a rare thing”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The work national institutions are doing are important for the agency`s work. The representatives on the management board have responsibility to make reports on the area of diseases prevention and control. The agency is using this to make it easier to cooperate between national authorities.

The ECDC management board has variation in their primary organizational affiliation. There is a majority from national ministries and agencies, but there are also representatives from expert and non-governmental organizations. The Norwegian representative said he did not change his role perception when attending the management board. He says the purpose with the agency is to make a good way of cooperation between the members government. *“Much of the foundation of this agency is to find good ways of cooperation between the nations authorities, founded on the nations work on the policy field”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

Representatives from other member states are also representing their government position on the policy field. The Norwegian representative said the representatives are supposed to present their own state position on different cases. *“If the representative is distant from the government position on the case, how can the agency understand the government position on the policy field?”* (Interview: Author`s translation). This is an indication of an intergovernmental arena for member states to present the government position on different cases in the policy field.

As mention before do the representatives stand relatively free from their domestic organization, primary affiliation, but they are conscious to represent their government. Their primary affiliation to domestic organization and their government seems to be strong in ECDC, and has a large effect on the role perception of representatives on the management boards.

There seems to a consensus on the management board that the representatives are supposed to have an intergovernmental role, and represent their nation authority`s position on the issues. It is on this basis ECDC and national authorities can best cooperate on disease control and prevention. The cooperation is also based on national health institutions work on the field of

disease control and prevention. Both domestic organizational structure and primary affiliation seems to be important for adopting an intergovernmental role on the management board in ECDC.

5.5 EMEA – European Medicines Agency

The EMEA management board consists of 27 representatives from the member states, two from the Commission, two from the European Parliament and seven observant, one of the observant is from Norway. Three of the observant are from EFTA countries and four of the observant are from expert and non-governmental organizations.

I interviewed the Norwegian representative on the EMEA management board, and the interview object is employed in the Norwegian Medicines Agency. She has been a representative on the management board since 1999, and has long experience on the management board.

The Norwegian representative is employed in the Norwegian Medicines Agency and she was appointed to the management board by the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services. *“It was the ministry that recommended me. The Norwegian Medicines Agency is an independent agency from the national ministry and does not receive instruction from the ministry. The agency has delegated authority from the national ministry”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

She enhanced that she is an observant with the other representatives from the EEA countries. At the meetings she is representing Norway; *“I represent Norway, that is clear”* (Interview: Author`s translation). The Norwegian representative also said it was much preparation for the management board meetings. *“Yes, I will say so. The paper-stack is about half a meter. I receive the documents for the meetings in one to two weeks beforehand. There is also documents arriving on the meetings, but there is not to be made any decisions on the documents arriving at the meetings”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative does not receive instructions from her domestic organization of what goals and interests to pursue on the management board. *“I collect comments on issues if I feel it is necessary. But I have not experienced to receive instructions”* (Interview: Author`s translation). Even if she is representing Norway the arguments are raised to a European level. *“By and large it is arguments on the European level. This is because it is a European agency”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The majority of the representatives on the EMEA management board come from national medicines agencies, and the minority comes from national ministries. *“Most of the members are leaders of national health agencies. And there are some representatives from national ministries”* (Interview: Author`s translation). Not all representatives on the management board have an expert background; she said *“they can be economists or jurists, and not expert on the policy field of medicines”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

Representatives from the other member states are also conscious of the role they adopt on the management board. She said all the members are representing both their own state and the agency. *“Most of the management board members have two hats. They are both leaders of national medicines agencies and representatives on the management board”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative said there was no use of experts in the board meetings. But she enhanced the two representatives from patient organization, the one representative from the European doctor organization and the one representative from the veterinary organization.

There is little variation of the representative`s primary affiliations. Representatives from the member states are largely leaders for a national medicines agency. There are also representatives with primary affiliation to patient organizations, doctor organizations and veterinary organizations. There are also representatives with primary affiliation to EU institutions; the Commission and the European Parliament.

EMA and the management board are dependent on the scientific work of the member states and their medicines institutions. The management board does not discuss purely scientific cases, but the EMA as an agency works on scientific cases. *“The agency is dependent on national medicines institutions to do the scientific work”* (Interview: Author`s translation). The management board is working on budgets, annual reports, working plans and strategies.

The Norwegian representative said the management board does not use scientific experts outside EMA to participate in the meetings even if they have the possibility. She said since they do not discuss scientific cases, they are using four representatives which are representing doctors and patients. She also said it was the agency that prepared the cases to be discussed on the management board. *“By and large it is the agency`s working groups that are preparing the cases to be discussed on the management board”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The representatives on the management board are representing their member states or organization. Even if they are representing their member state they are adopting a supranational role, since it is a European agency. The Norwegian representatives said all representatives have two hats, and are balancing the role as a national representatives and the role as board member on the supranational level.

5.6 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency

EMSA has 38 representatives on the management board, 27 from the EU member states, four from the Commission and 7 observant. The Norwegian representative is an observant and is represented as an EFTA member state, so is Iceland. The four other observant are from the maritime industry.

I interviewed the Norwegian representative on the management board and he is the director of the Norwegian Maritime directorate. The Norwegian representative has attended the five last board meetings in EMSA.

The Norwegian representative was appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, and I asked how he got appointed. *“It is an easy answer. All member states in EU and EEA have a right to be representatives on the management board. The director of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate was appointed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry as the Norwegian representative. The reason for choosing the director of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate is that EMSA work with a lot of the same case. It is not the person, but the director of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate. I have been attending the last five meetings on the management board (Interview: Author`s translation).*

The Norwegian representative to the EMSA management board is always the director of the Norwegian Maritime Directorate, and is related to the person itself. This implies that the Norwegian representative is appointed by their background on the field and their expertise. The Norwegian representative told me that he is working on many of the same issues in his domestic organization as he is doing on the management board in EMSA.

When the Norwegian representative is attending meetings on the EMSA management board he is representing Norway.

Question: *Who are you representing when you attend board meetings?*

***Answer:** Norway. Not the policy field. The starting point is that I am representing Norway, and the management board is an administrative board. We do not make policy, in which direction we are going and so on. That is decided in Brussels. We follow up on that EMSA do in relation to the working plan and the goals we have put up. It is more of a control board, than a board that is steering the course and find business opportunities.*

This implies that he is representing Norway and Norway's interests on the management board. He is representing the policy field and the management board is not making policies on the maritime field. It is the representative's position in his domestic organization that is relevant for him being appointed for the EMSA management board.

There are some preparations before the board meetings. *"We receive all documentation in good time before the meetings. In the Norwegian Maritime Directorate we do have a person which has responsibility for EEA cases, and will go through the papers concerning the different cases to work out suggestion for what is going to be Norway's position when the case is raised on the meetings. We have an administrative treatment on our side, work out a Norwegian position on the subject; it is not my personal position.*

The representative says he is receiving case documents from EMSA in good time before board meetings. He is not going over the documents on his own, but has a person which is in charge of EEA cases and he makes the preparation for the board meetings. The person responsible for EEA cases is also responsible for formulate the Norwegian position on the different issues, and it is not the representative own personal position. This can imply that the domestic organization can have an impact in formulating the Norwegian position on the different cases discussed on the management board.

The Norwegian representative does not receive instruction from his domestic organization or the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry. *"I do not receive instruction from my domestic organization. We do not work out position papers the Ministry of Trade and Industry are to approve. We shall have an objective understanding of what Norway's position is in the different cases. I can use last meeting as an example. Last meeting we decided on the new economic guidelines, and this is economic guidelines which affects all of EU and EUs institutions. In this case Norway did not have an opinion, we are just taking it in to consideration, and do not care much about it.*

The Norwegian representative does not receive instruction from the domestic organization or the ministry that appointed him. He and the organization are supposed to have an objective approach to formulate the Norwegian position on the management board. This implies a large degree of freedom when formulating the Norwegian position, but there is some degree of instruction in the sense that they are formulating Norway`s position.

The Norwegian representative believes the other representatives are conscious on role they adopt on the management board. *“I firmly believe the representatives are conscious on the role they adopt on the management board. A majority of the representatives are leaders of maritime administrations. Alternatively they come from national ministries, and this is because of the domestic organization of the maritime policy field. Great Britain is always represented by the Ministry of Transport. I have delegated authority from the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry.*

The Norwegian representative is relatively sure that the other representatives on the management board are conscious on the role they adopt on the management board, and most of the representatives have the same background as him; leader of a maritime administration in their own country. There are also representatives from national ministries such as Great Britain. This implies a coherent background of the representatives on the management board, and I do than assume they may have a similar role perception on the management board.

5.7 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

EUROFOUND has a different organizational structure of their management board than the others. It has organized it in a tripartite way, as they call it. It has divided the management board in three groups; one for government representatives, one for employees` organizations and one for employers` organizations.

The three groups are meeting on their own before all representatives are meeting in plenum. The different groups are preparing, on their own, on the different cases that are to be discussed in plenum. This is not the case on the other management boards, but it is an important part of the management board in EUROFOUND.

All member states have three representatives on the management board, one from the employee`s organization, one from the government and one from the employer`s organization. This tripartite organization of the management board makes it equal for all member states.

There are 84 representatives from EU member states and Norway, and there are three representatives from the Commission. There are no representatives from the European Parliament.

The Norwegian representative comes from the Norwegian employer's organization, and has been a representative on the management board for two years. She is representing Iceland as well as Norway on the management board. *"I am also representing Iceland on the management board. This has no practical consequences"* (Interview: Author's translation). The Norwegian representative also said she is conscious of the role she adopts on the management board. *"I represent something more than myself, I am not representing my organization either. It is to represent the employee's, we call it **"arbeidsgiveriet"**"*. (Interview: Author's translation). She said *"I am officially representing the employers for both Norway and Iceland"* (Interview: Author's translation).

The Norwegian representative has been a member of the management board for two years and has attended two meetings. She has not received instructions from her organization before she has attended these meetings. She also said it is in the three groups the politics are discussed, and are agreeing on a joint position to take to the plenum discussion. *"I can have an influence in the group meetings. If I get support for me stands this will be presented as the employer's opinion in plenum. There has been big complex cases that have been presented, at least the times I have attended"* (Interview: Author's translation).

"Preparation for the meetings depends on the agenda. I get the documents for the meetings a little late, time for preparation is short. The agenda and documents can come a week before the meeting, and this gives me short time for preparation" (Interview: Author's translation). Until now she has not had any cases to promote in the meetings. *"I have not had any cases to promote, I have been listening and learning"* (Interview: Author's translation). She enhanced she was learning a lot from the other European countries and the meetings in general. *"It is very informative to see what is moving around in Europe. I can see what other countries are preoccupied with. Last meeting we discussed the work-program, and that was very useful to hear and understand"* (Interview: Author's translation).

All member states have representatives from three different domestic organizations which they have their primary affiliation to. There is not a majority of representatives from one specific domestic organization; it is equal representation from three types of domestic organizations.

“Representatives on the management board are conscious on the role they adopt when attending board meetings, I would think. Some of them have been representatives on the management board for a long time” (Interview: Author`s translation). They are conscious when they adopt a role on the management board, but they are also conscious that they have to represent national interests. *“Representatives wants to make their own nation state most pleased”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

It is legitimate to take a national interest role in the discussion before concluding on a mutual position between the representatives. *“If there is an important proposal crosswise from national interests it has to be a national interest’s argument to put forward. Since we are much alike Sweden, Denmark, Finland and to some degree the Netherlands there will be a North-European argument”* (Interview: Author`s translation). Different countries have different ways of organizing the working life, and therefore there will be national interests to take into consideration. *“We have a different way of organizing our work life than many other countries in South- and East-Europe”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

Representatives on the EUROFOUND management board are representing their domestic organization, one of the three organizations represented on the board, and their government. They are using national interest arguments to come to a mutual agreement in the three different groups, and are representing a mutual position on the management board in plenum.

The Norwegian representative also said they are not supposed to represent their organization or government, they are supposed to represent something more than that. It seems to be a role conflict on the management board between national interests and not representing their government’s position.

5.8 Overview

Between the different management boards there are variation of how much domestic organizational structure and primary versus secondary affiliation influence representative’s role perception on the management board. There is less variation between representatives on the same management board. I will here give an overall overview of all the management boards according to the two organizational variables; domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation.

5.8.1 Domestic Organizational Structure

I put forward one hypothesis derived from the variable *domestic organizational structure*:

H₁: Representatives appointed from national ministries and national agencies may adopt an intergovernmental role perception on the management board. Representatives working in close relationship with their government may be more likely to adopt a role where they are representing their goals and interests. Representatives appointed from sector specialized or expert organizations may adopt an expert role on the management board. Representatives working in more scientific environment may more likely be preoccupied with professional autonomy and have less political loyalty to their government.

The composition of the management board is important. It is also important to know that it is the member states that appoint their representatives to the management board. What I mean with composition is the organizational background, domestic organization, of the representatives on the management board. It is the structure, goals and interests, of the domestic organization which is important for this study.

All of the management boards I have studied have a majority of representatives from national agencies and national ministries within the same policy field as the agency. There are also representatives from other domestic organizations, such as other expert organizations and interest organizations. On all of the management boards there are two to three representatives from the European Commission, and on three of the management boards there are two representatives from the European Parliament.

There are some variations between the five management boards, but all of them have a majority of representatives from national agencies and national ministries. This can imply that member states appoint representatives which are more or less close to the national government. Member states may want representatives which have good knowledge of the government's policy on the area.

The one management boards which have all representatives from the same domestic organizations are EUROFOUND. It has representatives from three domestic organizations; the employer's organizations, the employee's organization and the government. All member states have one representative from each organization. This tripartite way of organization of

the management board is equal for all member states, and makes the representation equal for all member states.

The representatives I interviewed when attending board meetings did not receive instructions from their domestic organization. All of them are more or less free from instruction, but all of them said there are some national interests to attend, but no direct instructions. The representatives can on own considerations discuss different cases with other people in their domestic organization, but it is the representatives themselves who decides if advice is necessary.

This shows that the representatives are loosely connected to the domestic organizations structure when they attend management board meetings in EU-level agencies. They have no direct instruction from their domestic organization, but they have a feeling of representing the policy area which the domestic organization working in. This can imply an indirect connection to the domestic organization and their work on the policy field. It is unrealistic to say they are totally free from their domestic organizational structure; goals and interests.

All interview objects I interviewed said that they where representing Norway on the management board. The Norwegian representatives on EASA and EMEA are representing Norway as a full member of the management board, and not as an expert on the policy field. The representative on the ECDCs management board is representing both Norway and the policy field. The Norwegian representative on EUROFOUND is representing both Norway and Iceland, but she is also representing “*something more than myself*” (Interview: Author`s translation).

This makes it clear that the representatives have a feeling of representing Norway on the management board. Representatives on ECDC, EMSA and EUROFOUND have a feeling of represent the policy field as well, but not their domestic organization. This can imply that they have an expert background or very good knowledge on the policy area, and thus have an obligation to do what is best for the policy area.

5.8.2 Organizational Affiliation

I put forward one hypothesis derived from organizational affiliation:

H₂: Representatives who have a strong primary affiliation to national ministries and national agencies may be influenced to an intergovernmental role on the management

board. Representatives who have strong primary affiliation and loyalty to their government may adopt a role where they are less attached and less loyalty to their secondary affiliation. Representatives with long time of service on the board may adopt a supranational role to their secondary affiliation; the management board. Representatives with a long time of service in a European context may more easily shift their loyalty to their secondary affiliation and adopt a supranational role on the management board.

I have made a distinction between primary affiliation and secondary affiliation. All representatives have their primary affiliation to their domestic organization and have their secondary affiliation to the management board in EU-level agencies. I wanted to find out if the representatives shift their loyalties from their domestic organization to the management board on the EU-level.

In the interview I also asked them if the other representatives had a conscious relationship to the role perception they adopt on the management board. All of the interview objects told me that they had a more or less conscious relationship to the role they adopt on the management board. The EASA has discussed the role perception on the management board, with instruction from the Commission to adopt a specific role. The instruction was that there were other arenas for national interests, and the representatives have to adopt a role perception where they have the best of the agency in mind. This is the only agency where they have a very strong supranational role in addition to the expert role.

All of the representatives I interviewed said they were representing Norway to a more or less degree; all representatives have an affiliation to their member state. There is a variation of the degree they are representing their member state. The representatives more or less change their role perception when attending management board meetings.

The representatives on ECDCs management board are supposed to represent their government's position on the cases which they discuss on the board, and find the best way for the member states to cooperate. Representatives on the EUROFOUND management board are supposed to have their national interests in mind in the under-groups, but have a common stand in plenum on the management board, supranational interests.

Representatives on the EASA management board are supposed to work for the best of the agency. The EASA management board has discussed the role perception the representatives

ought to have on the management board, with instruction from the Commission. This makes the secondary affiliation very important for the role perception of the representatives on the EASA management board.

The Norwegian representative on the EMEA management board said the representatives have to balance their role perception in a double-hatted manner. They have to find a balance between representing their domestic organization and the management board.

I will argue that the representatives role perception are to some degree influenced by the domestic organizational structure. All of the representatives have a feeling of representing their member states on the management board, but I will argue this is a symbolic representation. They are not exclusively representing their member states goals and interests. I will argue that they have this feeling of representing their nation state because they are appointed by their nation state and thus have this feeling of representation

The bottom line is that representatives, from the organizational theory variables, are adopting an ambiguous role perception where they have to balance the three roles. All of them are adopting a form of expert role and they are supplementing this role with a combination of the intergovernmental role and the supranational role.

6. The Influence of Institutional Features

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter I will focus on the institutional variables; institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board on the five management boards. Institutionalisation takes time, and the representatives have to be appointed for a period of time to get to know the institutionalized rules and norms. The interaction on the management board is more or less driven by rules of appropriateness.

For how long representatives have been appointed to the management board, length of service can have an effect on the role representatives adopt. The longer they have been representatives on the management board the more they are *infused with values* represented on the board. The management board will over time develop informal norms and rules the representatives have to follow, and may shape the role perception.

On management boards in EU-level agencies there can be different rules for interaction than at home, and the interaction is more or less driven by rules of appropriateness. Understanding of these rules makes representatives more likely to participate in the discussion on the management board.

I have to rely on the interview objects observation to find institutional characteristics on the management board. The interview objects were asked different questions about how the management board operates and if there are some informal norms and rules adapted to the management board.

I will have to rely on the interview objects when it comes to information about the interaction on the management board. This will make the foundation to make any assertions on the influence this can have on the role perception of representatives on the board.

I will first make it clear what I am looking for within institutionalization and interaction on the management board. There are many characteristics within institutionalization and interaction on the management board, and therefore I have to limit the factors and make it clear what I am looking for.

I will organize the analysis in the same way as with the organizational variables; analyze one agency at the time and at the end have an overview of all agencies according to the two institutional variables.

6.2 Institutionalization and Interaction on the Management Board

The institutional characteristics I am interested in are proceeding of the meetings, the use of voting (lack of the use of voting) and if the representatives know of the informal norms and rules on the management board. All the management boards have written rules for meeting procedures and the use of voting. It is also clear that the EU-level agencies are institutions and have informal norms and rules, and these can be in addition to the written rules or it can be an easier way of practical action of the written procedures.

We have to compare the written rules of procedure and the way things are done on the management board in EU-level agencies. There can be ways of doing the work without following the written rules accurately. Institutionalization of the management board has also to do with understanding the procedure, and how to be a part of the management board. The length of service will influence how well the representatives know the procedure of the management board, and how well they can use this knowledge.

The role perception the representatives on the management board adopt can be influenced by the interaction on the board meetings. The representatives need the knowledge of the rules of interaction, both formal and informal. The logic of appropriateness “sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized in to institutions” (March & Olsen: 2004: 1).

6.3 EASA – European Aviation Safety Agency

The agency was established in 2003 and has two annual meetings a year. The Norwegian representative on the EASA management board has been a member for two years, since 2006. The management boards have very specific written rules for procedure written in the Commissions regulations when establishing the agency. There are rules for which powers the agency has, the composition of the management board, for how long representatives can be a member of the board, rules for meetings at the management board and the use of voting on the management board.

The Norwegian representative`s adviser expressed this when asked about informal norms and rules on the management board. *“It is a formal agency, but the written rules are stricter than what is followed on the management board. It is a strict agenda on the management board, but the written rules of procedure sounds very, very formal, but it is more informal than the rules of procedure suggest when it comes to the management board. Some procedures on the*

management board are very strict, this is because of EU regulations, and it concerns elections to different positions and so on.” (Interview: Author`s translation).

This can imply that the rules of procedure are stricter than followed on the management board, but the meetings are still formal. The rules of procedure are very strict, so the management board has made some informal rules which are not that strict and formal as the rules of procedure. I will say over time the management board has developed an easier way to proceed on the management board than the rules of procedure.

The Norwegian representative on the management board does not have the right to vote on the management board. *“We are full members of the management board and pay equal as the other member states on the management board, but we do not have the right to vote on any issues. But it is very rare that the management board uses voting. I would call it a consensus agency. When voting occurs, we are present but not voting. Beside this are we treated as equal as all the other member states on the management board”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The Norwegian representative is a full member of the management board, but has not a right to vote on the management board. But there is little use voting on issues on the management board, so it has not a big impact on the Norwegian representative. The management board is working towards consensus, and in this way have found a way around the strict rules in the rules of procedure. In the rules of procedure there has to be 2/3 majority to decide on issues, but the management board has found another way to agree on issues. This is a less divisive way of working towards agreement on the management board than voting.

This can imply an institutionalization of informal rules and norms on the management board, which the representatives have to take into consideration when attending board meetings. All representatives have to learn the way the management board are operating.

The discussions on the EASA management board are informal and lively. *“I have the feeling that the tone of the discussions is relatively informal. Representatives take the word without necessary cleared their point of view beforehand, and it is a lively debate. Representatives take the word when they feel they have something to contribute to in the debate, it is not like any of the representatives restricts themselves. The debate is not totally open; there is some control of who has the word and so forth. Generally are there no obstacles to take part in the discussion”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

This implies an informal discussion in on the management boards, but as the interview object told me there are rules for how you can take the word. There is a lively debate and the representatives that feel they have a contribution to the discussion do so. I will say there is an institutionalization of the interaction on the management board, and the representatives have to get to know the form of interaction on the management board.

Representatives on the EASA management board are using most scientific arguments and European interest arguments, and less national interest arguments. *“I do not know if I can call them scientific arguments. They are using their knowledge as experts on the policy field. They are using their experiences from contact with markets and industries to present their case. There is little use of national interest arguments. There may be some use of national interest arguments from time to time, but that is not as a rule. There is very good cooperation generally in Europe, between EASA and the national aviation agencies. It is therefore often focusing on the management board for how to develop further the cooperation and make it better. We are working in the best interests of the agency, and purely national interests are very seldom used on this management board”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

The arguments used on the meetings on the management board can imply that the representatives adopt a supranational role in addition to the expert role. It accurse representatives are using national interest arguments. This can imply a role perception where the representatives adopt a mixture role of all the three roles.

There are representatives on the management board that is more active in the discussions than others, and it is the chairman that has the responsibility for the discussions. *“There will always be some representatives that are more active than others. Some represents member states with larger interests than others. There are also representatives who have been in the game longer than others, and there are different reasons for someone to be more active than others. It is the chairman that in a way steers the discussion and decides the meeting’s agenda. In this way has the chairman relatively much power”*.

The fact that some representatives are more active than others can imply that some representatives are more familiar with both the formal and informal rules of interaction on the management board. As the interview object said; there are some representatives that have been in the game longer. This is a sign of institutionalisation on the management board, and the representatives have to adapt to the logic of appropriateness when it comes to interaction on the management board.

6.4 ECDC – European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

The ECDC was established in 2004 and shall have at least two meetings a year and it can meet more than twice if at least one third of the management boards request it (ECDC MB2). From the agency establishing document there are rules of procedure and how the management shall operate and what their powers are.

The management board becomes over time a community that is working for the best of the agency. *“It is a fact that the representatives on the management board are appointed for a period of three to four years, and after a while it becomes a community between the representatives. This community, the management board, are being preoccupied to make the agency a success. Over time it evolves identification with the agency. We are represented at the management board to run the agency through long-term working plans and work programs. We participate in the profile-planning and the agency’s tasks”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

This implies an institutionalization of the management board when the management board becomes a community between the representatives. This community becomes preoccupied to work in the best interest of the agency, the supranational level. The interview object also said it is evolving identification with the agency, which implies institutionalization.

The Norwegian representative said there was little use of voting on the ECDC management board, and that they are working towards consensus. *“There is little use of voting. There is voting when we are appointing director. Representatives from EEA are then not allowed to vote, and there is voting when we are deciding on budgets. There is little difference between representatives from EU member states and representatives which are not members of the EU. It is a high degree of consensus. There is very seldom big and complex disagreement on the cases and we are finding good solutions”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

The management board seems to come to agreements without the use of voting when it comes to cases. They are using voting when it comes to the budget. The representatives are working towards consensus, and there are seldom large disagreements between the representatives but accure. The little use of voting can be an implication of institutionalization where the formal rules are replaced by a more soft way of coming to an agreement.

There has been some disagreement on the management board. *“There have been some items which have been of a character where there have been different approaches. One example is*

how clear ECDCs policy is supposed to be. Should ECDC be active in deciding specific solutions, or should ECDC be more neutral in these cases. It is often that ECDC, with considerable standing, recommend members to adopt new vaccines in their vaccines-program does this not erupt in a political vacuum. Large countries think ECDC should be careful in such cases. Smaller countries think it is important with such guidelines” (Interview: Author`s translation).

When it comes to disagreements it can seem as the representatives argues from their member state interests and not on the European level. This use of national interest arguments in the discussion when there are disagreements can imply a role of combination between an expert role and an intergovernmental role.

The discussions on the ECDC management board are much alike what the representatives have experienced from Norway. *“It is not much different from what I have experienced in Norway. It is a bit more formal, but not much. You notice that there are different cultures in different countries. Some of the representatives go straight to the point without too much ifs and buts. Other representatives are more focused on the formal part of the discussion. By and large is the discussion very focused on the issue at hand, and there is no specific procedure for taking the word. The only restrictions for non-member-states are that we do not have the possibility to vote in the meetings” (Interview: Author`s translation).*

The discussion on the management board seems to be informal in its tone and not as formal as the rules of procedure suggest. There is no restriction for representatives to participate in the discussion, but there is some variation between the representatives. Some of the representatives are more focused on the formal rules than others.

ECDC has established a scientific unit which prepare the scientific cases on the management board. Representatives on the management board are using both scientific arguments and national interest arguments.

Question: *Are the representatives using scientific arguments?*

Answer: *Yes, ECDC has gradually developed a section-organizing which can illustrate the assignments; scientific units. There is one unit for risk evaluation. They are not a part of the management board; they are part of the leadership in ECDC. The administration is preparing the paperwork for the board meetings. They are giving a presentation of the cases and are answering question on the presentation on the management board.*

Question: *Are the representatives using national interest arguments?*

Answer: *The representatives are sitting on the management board to look after their states interests. That is the starting point. (Interview: Author`s translation).*

There are experts that attend the management board meetings to present different cases where there is focus on scientific arguments. These experts are not a part of the management board, but are presenting the different cases. Representatives on the management board are using more state interests in their argument. This implies that the representatives are adopting an intergovernmental role in addition to the expert role.

There are representatives that are more active than others on the management board. *“Yes, there are some that are more active than others; there are representatives from some member states that ask for the word more than others. Not necessary large member states, but that can be a tendency. Member states such as England, Germany, France and Italy have representatives that are more active than representatives from other member states. This has probably something to do with language. It is in a way easier for representatives with good English to take the word in an easier way. Language is a recurrent topic. There is translation in some of the meetings, so there is a possibility to speak German, French and Spanish sometimes. This is a hot topic, many of the representative`s means that English should be the only language on the management board”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

There is a variation when it comes to the degree of participation on the management board, and this variation can be visualized in the sense that representatives from large member states are more active than representatives from smaller member states. There is also a variation between representatives when it comes to language, representatives who are good in English are more active and representatives as which are not that good in English are less active.

6.5 EMEA – European Medicines Agency

EMA was established in 2004 and shall have at least two meetings a year. From the agency establishing document there are rules of procedure and how the management shall operate and what their powers are. These are the formal rules, but I will here concentrate on the informal norms and rules of the management board.

The Norwegian representative on the EMA management board expressed there was informal rules and norms on the management board. *“There are informal norms and rules on the*

management board; this is because there are routines for how things are done. To be a new representative on the management board can make it problematic to follow the cases discussed on the management board. The cases can be difficult and can be hard to grasp the cases all at once” (Interview: Author`s translation).

There seems to be formal and informal rules representatives on the management board have to follow; there are routines for how things are done. The interview object said new representatives to the management board has to get to know these formal and informal rules and they have to get familiar with the cases discussed on the management board. This is an indication of institutionalization of the representatives on the management board.

The Norwegian representative is an observant on the management board and do not have the right to vote. There is only use of voting in the cases where there are election on chairman and vice chairman. *“I do not have the right to vote, but I have the right to speak if I want. I am using that right. I am the representative with longest time on the management board. There is no use of voting. We are working towards consensus, and are not voting on regular cases. We are voting when there are election on chairman and vice chairman. The representative with the right to vote votes, and I am in the group that is counting the votes”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

There seems to be little difference between representatives with the right to vote from the representatives with not the right to vote when it comes to cases. The management board is not using voting when deciding on cases. They are only voting when it comes to election of chairman and vice chairman. In general the management board is working towards consensus, and all of the representatives can speak and make their argument in the board meetings.

“There is a decent tone in the discussion on the management board. We have a very good chairman. There is a system for how the discussion is run. We have signs on the table under the discussion where it stands the representatives name and member state. We are putting the sign edgewise to give the signal that we want to participate in the discussion. Then the chairman gives us the word. We start our contribution with “thank you Mr. Chairman”. There are some formalities but it is not difficult to take the word on the management board. Everybody can take the word, and all will be given the word” (Interview: Author`s translation).

There are some formalities when representatives want to put forward their arguments and position on different cases, but it is not a very difficult to take the word. It seems that the formalities the interview object put forward are in place to make sure some form of structure in the discussion. It can be a sign of institutionalization of the management board and the representatives have to get familiar with the interaction procedure. This is also a sign of the logic of appropriateness that is followed on the management board.

The arguments used on the management board meetings are raised to the European level. *“By and large it is used arguments on the European level. This is because it is a European agency. As an observant it is important to have unbiased arguments. If we have unbiased arguments, the arguments be heard. The agency is dependent on the member states medicines agencies to do the scientific work. It is national medicines agencies that do the work for EMEA. We are not discussing scientific cases on the management board. We are discussing budgets, annual reports, work programs, strategies and so forth”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

In the discussion on the management board the representatives are raising their arguments to the European level. This implies that the representatives have a supranational role in addition to the expert role. The interview object also said if representatives ought to be heard they have to have unbiased arguments, especially if you are an observant on the management board. The management board is not discussing scientific cases, but because of the representatives background they will have a more or less degree of expertise on the area.

There is a difference between the representatives when it comes to who are participating in the board meetings. *“Representatives on the management board with long time service are more active, but it varies a bit. You can say that we, representatives with long time of service, have a bigger depth in the cases discussed on the management board. It is an advantage to have a long time of service”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The variation of participation on the management board seems to be divided between representatives with long time of service and representatives with short term of service. The interview object said it was an advantage to have a long time of service and good understanding of the different cases. It is also a sign of institutionalization of the representatives on the management board. They have to have some experience on the management board to be familiar whit the cases and the procedure of interaction; the logic of appropriateness in the interaction and discussion on the board meetings.

6.6 EMSA – European Maritime Safety Agency

The Norwegian representative said there were no particular informal rules or norms on the management board. *“No, I would not say that. It is formal, and the rules of procedure are followed* (Interview: Author`s translation).

It seems that the EMSA management board is formal in its procedure. This can imply that representatives have to be familiar with the rules of procedure, and do not have to be institutionalized in large degree on the management board. This may be false, because later in the interview the interview object gives examples of practices which are not as strict as the rules of procedure.

EMSA are not using voting to decide on cases and they are working towards consensus. *“No, we are not voting on different cases. There is not a difference in arguments from those who have the right to vote and those who do not have the right to vote. The backside of not have the right to vote is that you do not get a breakthrough in the same way; you do not have the possibility to mark your disagreement in the same way. Until now have there not been a case where that has been a necessity to vote”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The management board are working towards consensus and are seldom using voting to decide on different cases. There is also little difference between representatives with the right to vote and representatives with not the right to vote. The only backside with not have the right to vote is that the representative does not have the opportunity to firmly disagree with a “no vote” if there is a vote. As long as the Norwegian representative has been a part of the management board there has not been a vote on a case.

There is a structure for the discussion but the structure is not strict and all representatives that want to participate can. *“There is a discussion, then the chairman sum ups the different points of view and all arguments are registered. We are working to come to an agreement; consensus. There is no special way to construct the discussion. It is the chairman which is steering the meetings, naturally. The chairman presents the different cases and asks for contribution, comments, or anything at all. It is not difficult to take the word; it is just to jump in to the discussion”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

It seems to be an informal structure of the discussion on the management board and all representatives that has something to contribute with have the possibility to express their point of view. It is the chairman that presents the different cases and then there is a discussion

where the representatives are expressing their position on the case. The interview object also said it was easy to take the word and present their point of view.

The arguments used on the management board are depending on the cases up for decision. *“You can say I am adopting a European role when there are cases which have nothing to do with special field of maritime safety. Then I have the possibility to lift your perspective, and in a way see with helicopter-perspective. When it comes to the maritime subject, like maritime safety, then it is the expert point of view that comes to light. Sometimes in the debate there come national characteristics to light. It can be geography. Norway has a different coastline than for example Spain. We are more on the alert when there is a discussion where we think Norway have national characteristics”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

This can imply that representatives on the management board adopt their role depending on the case up for discussion. If there is strong national interest in a case the representative use national interest arguments and if there is no national interests on the line the representatives adopt a more supranational role with European interest arguments. I will say this strongly implies an ambiguous role perception the representatives on the EMSA management board have.

There is a difference in the degree of participation on the EMSA management board. *“There is a difference between the representatives when it comes to participation on the board meetings. The range is quite big. An example can be between Iceland and France. Iceland is very little involved in the discussion. This can has to do with the fact that Iceland has a big fishing fleet and not a big commercial fleet. When it comes to ship-safety is Iceland almost totally invisible. Representatives from Baltic States are less involved in the discussions; this has to do with language. Their language does not get translated, and their English is not very good. When I am paying attention I see they are very quite. There is little difference between new representatives and experienced representatives, this may occur in the starting phase of a new representative* (Interview: Author`s translation).

The variation of participation has to do with both the cases up for discussion and their language skills. The interview object said as an example that Iceland is less involved in the discussion when it comes to discussion on ship-safety in comparison to France. This variation of has to do with the case. The variation when it comes to language is more related to the Baltic States. The interview object said there was little difference when it came to old or new representatives on the management board. This can imply that representatives do not have to

be institutionalized to participate in the discussion, and the variation of participation has more to do with other obstacles.

6.7 EUROFOUND – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

The Norwegian representative said there are informal rules and norms on the management board as well as rules of procedures to follow. She gives the impression that she is not quite familiar with all the informal rules and norms on the board. *“I think there are informal rules and norms on the management board. There are some that are very familiar with the system. My attitude has been to listen and learn. The under-groups are meeting before the management board meets. This time it will be a few months before. I anticipate that the under-group is preparing the documents which we are to discuss and take a decision on in the next board meeting. Then it is important that someone knows the rules and the system. There is also someone that is too preoccupied with formalities and things like that. There are always representatives from the Commission and bureaucrats attending the meetings, and they have good knowledge about the rules of procedure”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

As a relatively new representative on the management board the Norwegian thinks there are informal rules and norms on the management board. This implies that there are informal rules and norms on the management board, but because she is a relatively new member of the board she has not gained the knowledge of these informal rules and norms. And she points out that some representatives are very familiar with the system. Representatives from the Commission and EU bureaucrats are very familiar with the rules of procedure.

In EUROFOUND is there little use of voting on cases, and the management board is working toward consensus. *“We are discussing our way to consensus, and there is no use of voting. Last time in the under-group we discussed a working plan for EUROFOUND for 2010 and 2011, and then there was a research paper which was in the working plan which there was a disagreement on. Then we discussed back and forth until we came to a consensus. All the arguments presented under the discussion of the working plan were noted down. The notes are read up and copied to after the break and then worked into the final text presented for the management board in plenum. When it was presented on the board meeting in plenum was it a united employee’s grouping from the European member states. We are also working towards consensus on the management board. There has still not been a case we had to vote on to come to a decision”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

The EUROFOUND management board are working towards consensus and are not using voting to decide on different cases. This can be a sign of an informal rule that has compensated for the voting rules presented in the founding document; rules of procedure. The EUROFUNDS under-groups are presenting a common stand on the management board in plenum.

There are different discussion procedures in the under-groups of the management board and the management board in plenum. *“In the under-group it is to raise your finger and you get the word. And here has the discussion been uncomplicated, nothing formal at all, and there are no phrases before you start speaking. The under-group has a chairman and a vice chairman. On the management board you are always starting with Mr. President or Mr. Chairman before you speak. The meetings on the management board seem planed. It is planned who are going to present the position, and there is one or two who are supporting the position presented. It is usual the chairman of the under-group which is presenting the common stand and the vice chairman which is supporting the common stand* (Interview: Author`s translation).

It is less formal in the under-groups and more formal and planned on the management board in plenum. It is lively debate in the under-groups and it is easy to take the word and make your position known. On the management board in plenum it is planned who are going to present the different positions and who are going to support the position. It is usually the chairman and vice chairman of the under-groups that is presenting and supporting the position.

The arguments used in the under-group and the management board depend in the issue at hand. They are often using national interest arguments in the under-group to come to a common position to take to the management board in plenum. At the management board presents all the under-groups a common stand on the issue.

Question: *“Are the representatives using scientific arguments?”*

Answer: *I cannot really answer that. There is always someone who is referring to surveys and research papers, but that is more political”* (Interview: Author`s translation).

Question: *Are the representatives using national interest arguments?*

Answer: *It is national representatives in a community. And it is the community which in one way or another that are going to take a decision on the behalf of the member states. So I will think they are national representatives. We cannot suddenly forget who they in a way represent and what is important for us, either the representative comes from Poland, Italy Spain. We want in a way our own country to come best out of the decisions made. We are then on a detail level. It can happen that a country without regulation on an area is being forced to have regulation on the area. They have to argue against the regulation or for another type of regulation. It has to be legitimate to take national consideration in the debate, before we conclude on a common stand in the under-group” (Interview: Author`s translation).*

The fact that representatives are using both scientific arguments and national interest arguments; it can be a sign of a role mixed role between an intergovernmental role and an expert role. The interview object said it is legitimate to use national interest arguments and work for the best result for their own nation state. In addition, the interview object said, that the management board is a community working for consensus. This can imply that the representatives feel it is a community which is more than an intergovernmental arena, and thus adopt a supranational role into the mix. It can seems like the role they adopt is a mixture of all the three roles; an ambiguous role perception.

6.8 Overview

Institutional theory can account for some variation of role perception on the management board. I have concentrated on institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board. Which role and variation of roles the representatives adopt on the management board can be, to some degree, explained by institutional theory. I will here give an overall overview of the role perception of representatives on the management boards according to the two institutional variables; institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board.

From the interview in general I will imply that the management boards have signs of institutionalization of the management board, and there are signs of how representatives should behave on the management boards; logic of appropriateness.

6.8.1 Institutionalization of the board

I put forward a hypothesis for institutionalization of the management board:

H₃: Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt a supranational role. Representatives who are well known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management boards and “how things are done” may more likely identify with the management board, thus adopt a supranational role. Representatives who are less known with the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board may adopt an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less known with the formal and informal rules and norms may not identify themselves with the management boards.

As I have said before; institutionalization takes time. The representatives on the management boards have to be a representative over time to get to know the institutionalized rules and norms on the management board. It is then important to find out if there are informal rules and norms on the management boards, and what they are. All interview objects except one said there were informal rules and norms on the management boards. The interview object which said there were no informal rules and norms did later in the interview express informal rules and norms used on the management board, so I will say all management boards have more or less some informal rules and norms.

The anticipation that institutionalization takes time is supported by the Norwegian representative on EUROFOUNDs management board when she enhanced that she has been there to listen and learn the two times she has attended board meetings. She admits she does not know all the informal rules and norms of the management board. Even if she does not know all the informal rules and norms she is certain that there are such informal rules and norms on the management board.

On all of the management boards they have found a way of proceed on the board meetings that are less formal than the rules of procedure. The rules are very detailed and formal, and it seems like the management boards find them to be too detailed and formal. They have found ways that are within the limit of the rules, but are not strictly following them.

One of the clearest sign of informal rules and norms are the minimal use of voting. All the agencies have rules of procedure which are very specific on how to decide on different cases and one of these are rules for voting. To decide on a case there have to be a two-third

majority. The little use of voting implies that the management boards have found a more informal way of coming to agreements without the use of voting. All of the management boards are striving, working and discussing their way to consensus.

All of the Norwegian representatives also expressed that they were full member of the management board even if they did not have the right to vote. This can imply that the management boards are more interested in good and valid arguments than how different representatives may vote on different cases and issues.

I will from this argue that the institutionalization of the management boards may affect the representatives to adopt a supranational role in addition to an expert role. When the representatives are adapting and learning the informal rules and norms they get to know “how things are done” on the management board. As the representative from the ECDC management board expressed it; *“Over time it evolves an identification with the agency”* (Interview: Author’s translation).

We also have to take into account that representatives with good knowledge of the informal rules and norms have the possibility to use that knowledge to promote national interests in a subtle way.

6.8.2 Interaction on the Board

I put forward a hypothesis for interaction on the management board:

H₄: Representatives who have a large degree of interaction on the management board may be influenced to a supranational role perception on the management board. Representatives who are active and participate on the management board know what is acceptable behaviour on the board meetings. The more the representatives interact on the management board the more likely they may identify with the agency, and work for the best of the agency and the whole of EU. Representatives with little degree of interaction on the management board may influence to an intergovernmental role on the management board. Representatives who are less active and participate less may more likely involve themselves when national interests are at stake, and argue with national interests arguments.

The general notion when it comes to interaction on the management boards are that all representatives are following a form of logic of appropriateness. There are both formal and

informal rules for how to interact in the discussion on the management boards. There are different formal and informal rules on the different management boards, but there are formal and informal rules on all the management boards. These formal and informal rules and norms for interaction affect the representatives in different ways.

How the discussions on the management boards are formalized is important for the role representatives adopt. If the discussion procedure is relatively free the representatives stand more freely to adopt a role perception they define on their own. In general the discussion on the different management boards are relatively free and all representatives have the possibility to participate in the discussion. This can be a sign of the how free representatives are to adopt a role perception of their wish. This is not the most significant factor when it comes to influence the representative's role perception.

Who are active and not active on the board meetings is important to find out what role perception representatives adopt on the management boards. On all the management boards there are variations between representatives when it comes to participation in the board meetings. The variation is explained by the length of service and the language skills of the representatives.

Length of service is closely related to institutionalization of the management board, but is also important when it comes to interaction on the management board. The Norwegian representatives on the management boards said there was a difference on the level of participation in the discussions, and the representatives with long time of service were more active in the discussions. This has to do with both institutionalization and the knowledge of the discussion procedures; logic of appropriateness.

Language skills were also a factor in the degree of participation in the discussions on the management boards. There were two Norwegian representatives, from ECDC and EMSA, which expressed the language factor when it comes to participation on the meetings. This may have an impact on the role perception the representatives on the management boards adopt, but it is not a major factor in the adoption of the role.

I will argue that the arguments used on the management board meetings are the most important factor when it comes to determine the role perception of different representatives on the management boards. There is most variation between the different management boards than between representatives on the same management board. On all the management boards

the representatives are using some form of scientific arguments or expert arguments. This has to do with their good knowledge on the policy area and their domestic organizational background. I will also say there is a combination in the use of national interest arguments and European arguments.

The Norwegian representative on the ECDC management board expressed that there was use of expert arguments and national interest arguments. The representatives are represented as national officials and are supposed to present their interests on the management boards. Here it seems relatively clear that the representatives are adopting a role perception which is a combination of both an expert role and an intergovernmental role.

On the four other management boards there seems to be a combination of all three arguments. This is depended on what the agency expect the representatives to represent and it depends on the nature of the cases. EASA has discussed the representative's role on the management board, and all representatives are supposed to work for the best of the agency. On the EASA management board there is than little use of national interest arguments, but it accurse. This can imply a supranational role in addition to the expert role.

At the EMEA management board the arguments are raised to a European level and there is little use of national interest arguments. The representatives are also using scientific or expert arguments to put forward their case and interests. The Norwegian representative also said it was important to present unbiased arguments. This can imply a supranational role in addition to the expert role.

At the EMSA management board the arguments depend on the case up for discussion. If there is vital national interest at stake, there will be used national interest arguments, and if it is not vital national interests at stake there is use of European arguments. There seems to be a very unclear and diffuse role perception on the EMSA management board, and it a combination of all three roles.

At the EUROFOUND management board there is use of scientific or expert arguments; representatives are referring to surveys and research papers. There is also use of national interest arguments. National interest arguments are used depending on case and if there are vital national interests at stake. This can imply a role where the representatives adopt their role depending on the case up for discussion.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Findings in This Study

I have studied variation in role perception on management board in EU-level agencies in this study. The theoretical framework I used was organizational theory; domestic organizational structure and organizational affiliation, and institutional theory; institutionalization of the management board and interaction on the management board. I have used these theories to explain some of variation of role perception on the management boards. I concentrated on three different roles; *the supranational role, the intergovernmental role and the expert role*.

I have anticipated that domestic organizational structure, organizational affiliation, institutionalization and interaction on the management board can explain some of the variation of role perception on the management board. I have also anticipated that the representatives may adopt an ambiguous role perception where they have to balance the three different roles.

The four variables are influencing the role perception, but the four different variables are influencing in different degree and in direction of different roles. The two organizational variables are influencing in the direction of an intergovernmental role perception. The representatives did not receive instruction from their domestic organization but they had a feeling of more or less representing their member state.

The two institutional variables influences to a supranational role perception. Representatives did more or less identify themselves with the management board and the work of the agency. On all the management board there were informal norms and rules, and this was made clear in the minimal use of voting. There was no or very little use of voting on all of the management boards, even if the rules of procedure says there has to be a two-third majority to make decisions on the management boards.

Their extensive background on the policy field and the expertise of the representatives influences in the direction of the expert role. In the rules of procedure there are clear rules of the expert background representatives shall have to be appointed to the management board. All interview objects expressed there were large degree of expertise on the management boards, and all representatives had good knowledge on the policy field.

There was more variation between the agencies than between representatives on each management board. There were some variations between the representatives on the same management board, but not large differences. It seemed to be an underlying agreement of the role representatives were supposed to have on the management board.

All variables are influencing to an ambiguous role perception where representatives have to balance the three different roles. All representatives have an extensive background on the policy field and can be characterized as experts, the representatives have more or less a feeling of representing their member state and the representatives identify themselves more or less with the management board.

7.2 Representation in EU

These findings are in accordance with earlier studies on the subject of role perception in the EU system. As Egeberg found in his study of role perception of national officials involved in EU decision-making, representatives shifts to some degree their loyalty over time to the supranational level. Egeberg points out that the shifts of loyalties are only marginal, and are supplementing their existing role with the supranational role.

The findings are also in accordance with the study Trondal and Veggeland made on domestic civil servants in EU committees and “the conflict between political loyalty and professional autonomy” (Trondal & Veggeland 2003: 59). They observed that domestic civil servants, some more than others, adopts a supranational role attending in EU committees. Between the management boards there are some representatives that more than others are adopting a supranational role when attending board meetings.

There seems to a tendency where temporary representatives in EU institutions are adopting an ambiguous role perception where they have to balance different roles. They have loyalties to their primary affiliation at home, but by working in the European system over time they are to some degree shifting their loyalties to the supranational level.

7.3 Further Studies

This study has some limitations when it comes to generalization of representatives on management boards in EU-level agencies. I studied five out of thirty-five EU-level agencies and their management boards, and I interviewed only one on each management board. The use of few cases and interviews was made on the reason of limited resources. This makes it

difficult to generalize. The Norwegian representatives may have a different understanding of the roles representatives in general adopt on the management board, and thus made a bias impression of the role perception on the management boards.

What this study has done is made some of the groundwork for further studies on the subject of representatives on the management boards in EU-level agencies. Further studies may focus on a larger selection of cases and representatives and do a quantitative study of role perception on the management boards with representatives from different member states. A quantitative study may support the findings in this study or it may find some nuances not found in this study.

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